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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN APPLIED ECONOMIC THEORY
Sadettin Haluk Çitçi
Ph.D., Economics, Spring 2012
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Eren ·Inci and Asst. Prof. Remzi Kaygusuz
Keywords Polygyny, Monogamy, Development, Career Concern, Risk Taking
This dissertation consists of two chapters that are independent of each other.
Each of them represents an area of my research interests. The rst chapter con-
tributes to the fascinating and growing literature of Family Macroeconomics. In
this chapter, we o¤er a simple theory that explains why polygyny marriage has al-
most disappeared in modern industrialized countries although it had been common
in most of the societies throughout history. We demonstrate that the increase in
labor income through the process of economic development has led to the rise of
monogamy. Specically, we show in a general equilibrium model of marriage mar-
ket that the increase in labor income improves womens outside option, monogamy
mating. This, in turn, reduces polygyny by increasing the cost of polygyny mating
for men. The second chapter is a joint work with Eren Inci and it contributes to
the nancial economics and career concerns literatures. In particular, we analyze
how CEOslayo¤ risk a¤ects their risk choice in overseeing the rm. We provide
a novel mechanism in which CEOs can change markets belief about their ability
by their risk choice. We show that a CEO can decrease her layo¤ risk by taking
excessive risk and trade o¤ current compensation for layo¤ risk. We allow for any
linear combination of xed-wage and stock compensation and show that there are
market structures in which explicit incentives are not helpful in preventing CEOs
from taking excessive risk.
.
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ÖZET
ESSAYS IN APPLIED ECONOMIC THEORY
Sadettin Haluk Çitçi
Doktor, Ekonomi, Bahar 2012
Dan¬¸sman: Yrd. Doçent Eren ·Inci ve Yrd. Doçent Remzi Kaygusuz
Anahtar Kelimeler Tek Es¸li Evlilik, Çok Es¸li Evlilik, Kalk¬nma, Kariyer
Kayg¬s¬, Risk Alma
Bu tez birbirinden ba¼g¬ms¬z iki konuyu içermektedir. Bunlardan herbiri il-
gilendi¼gim aras¸t¬rma alanlar¬n¬ temsil etmektedir. Tezin ilk bölümü etkileyici ve
büyüyen Aile Makroekonomisi literatürüne katk¬yapmaktad¬r. Bu bölümde, çok
es¸li evlili¼gin tarih boyunca birçok toplumda yayg¬n olmas¬na ra¼gmen neden modern
geli¸smi¸s ülkelerde neredeyse kayboldu¼gunu aç¬klayan bir kuram öneriyoruz. Ekonomik
kalk¬nma sürecinde i¸s piyasas¬ndaki ücret seviyesinin artmas¬n¬n tek es¸li evlili¼gin
yükseli¸sine neden oldu¼gunu gösteriyoruz. Özellikle, bir evlilik pazar¬genel denge
modeli kapsam¬nda, i¸s piyasas¬ndaki ücret seviyesinin artmas¬n¬n kad¬nlar için tek
es¸li evlili¼gin de¼gerini artt¬rd¬¼g¬n¬, bunun da erkekler için çok es¸li evlili¼gin maliyetini
yükseltmek suretiyle çok es¸lili¼gi azalt¬¼g¬n¬gösteriyoruz. Tezin ikinci bölümü ise Eren
·Inci ile birlikte yaz¬lm¬¸s olup, nansal ekonomi ve kariyer kayg¬s¬literatürlerine katk¬
yapmaktad¬r. ·Ikinci bölümde, özellikle, CEOlar¬n i¸sten at¬lma risklerinin rmay¬
yönetirken seçtikleri risk seviyesine etkisini analiz ediyoruz. CEOlar¬n risk seçimleri
vas¬tas¬yla piyasan¬n onlar¬n yönetim kabiliyetleri hakk¬ndaki kanaatlerini de¼gi¸stire-
bilce¼gini gösteren özgün bir mekanizma sunuyoruz. CEOlar¬n as¸¬r¬risk alarak, i¸sten
at¬lma risklerini azaltabildiklerini ve bugün daha az ücret almak pahas¬na yar¬n kar¸s¬
kar¸s¬ya kalacaklar¬ i¸sten at¬lma riskini azaltmaya çal¬¸st¬klar¬n¬gösteriyoruz. Mod-
elde, sabit ücret ve s¸irket hissesi cinsinden ödemelerin her türlü do¼grusal kar¬¸s¬m¬na
izin veriyor ve tes¸viklerin CEOlar¬n as¸¬r¬ risk almas¬n¬ önleyemeyebilece¼gi pazar
yap¬lar¬n¬n oldu¼gunu gösteriyoruz.
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CHAPTER 1
THE RISE OF MONOGAMY
1.1 Introduction
Polygynous mating is a global phenomenon in the sense that it has occurred
in most of the societies throughout history. For example, Murdocks Ethnographic
Atlas mentions that polygyny exists in 850 of the 1,170 societies although its degree
varies among them (Hartung, 1982). Similarly, Human Area les documents that
93% of 1154 recorded societies recognize some degree of polygyny (Clark, 1998).
Moreover, polygyny is not an issue of the past. We still observe polygynous marriage
up to 55% in many countries. On the other hand, polygynous mating is almost
nonexistent in developed countries which is labelled as the mystery of monogamy
(Gould et al., 2008). These observations led to the following questions: why did
marriage type evolve into monogamy in the course of economic development? Which
factors determine the form of marriage in a given society? This paper aims to answer
these questions with a simple general equilibrium model.
One of the key features of current advanced economies is that average labor
income in these countries is much higher than the average in traditional societies.
Moreover, both of empirical studies and growth theory show that economic devel-
opment is positively associated with labor income. I base my hypothesis on this
fact. I argue that the increase of labor income led to the virtual disappearance of
polygyny in modern industrialized countries. Specically, I demonstrate that above
a su¢ ciently high level of labor income, polygynous mating disappears.
I build a framework where there are two groups of men with di¤erent income
levels, while all women are identical. Each individual values consumption, spending
time together (the amount of marital interaction) with the mate, number of o¤spring
and future incomes of own children.
Men and women di¤er in their reproductive ability. Women are assumed to be
biologically constrained to have a nite number of children and they cannot increase
their o¤spring by increasing the number of their spouses. On the other hand, men
can increase the number of their children by increasing the number of their mates.
This gives men an incentive to marry polygynously and it yields competition among
men for mates. All else equal, a womans utility decreases with the number of women
in the household. Since, as the number of woman increases, the marital interaction
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of per wife decreases. In order to marry polygynously, men have to compensate for
the loss in womens utility due to lower marital interaction. The compensation takes
the form of transfers to each wife and higher bequests to children more than they
would get in a monogamous marriage. These economic advantages that needed to
be o¤ered in polygynous marriage also constitute the cost of polygyny for men.
Change in labor income alters the cost of polygynous mating in various ways.
First, when labor income of women increases, they allocate more resources for their
own consumption and leave larger bequests to their children. As a result, economic
advantages provided by men in polygynous mating become relatively less impor-
tant and men need to o¤er higher amount of resources to compensate for womens
forgone utility that results from sharing their husbands with co-wives. This makes
polygynous mating more costly for men. Hence, the degree of polygyny and the in-
come of women are negatively related. Second, as labor income increases, a woman
anticipates that her son will earn a higher income in the labor market. Thus, the
marginal benet that a woman derives from the bequest left to her son diminishes.
Consequently, in order to convince a woman to participate in polygynous mating,
men need to transfer more resources to her or increase the amount of the bequest left
to her son. Hence, the incidence of polygyny declines, as labor income of children,
which is equal to the return on human capital in the model, increases. Note that
this change does not happen due to mens demand shift from the quantity to quality
of children, known as the quantity-quality trade-o¤, but rather due to the increased
cost of polygynous mating.
The hypothesis is consistent with existing empirical evidence. Cross-country
analysis of Kanazawa et al. (1999) supports that increase of labor income signi-
cantly reduces polygyny. Moreover, Tertilt (2006) provide evidence on that women
empowerment and the degree of polygyny are negatively correlated. Similarly, the
predicted negative correlation between the socioeconomic status of women and prob-
ability of involvement in a polygynous mating is consistent with the ndings of Ware
(1979) and Armstrong (1993).
Surprisingly, the number of studies on the relation of monogamy and develop-
ment are quite limited in economics. Becker (1991) argues that womens marginal
productivity in production and care of children is higher than mens productivity. As
a result, rich men have incentive to marry polygynously. However, economic devel-
opment has reduced the demand of households for quantity of children and increased
the demand for quality of children. Since men have greater marginal contribution
to quality of children relative to quantity of them, the demand shift for quality have
increased the marginal productivity of men in the production of children. This, in
turn, has reduced mens incentive to marry polygynously.
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Lagerlof (2005) contends that income inequality among men leads to inequality in
the number of wives, as well. He argues that the decline in the incidence of polygyny
in modern industrialized countries is due to the decline in income inequality among
men.
Gould, Moav and Simhon (2008) explain the nonexistence of polygyny in the
presence of high male inequality as a result of the trade-o¤ between the quantity
and quality of children. They argue that when the return on human capital is
high, rich men may choose to marry one well-educated, high skilled woman who
can provide human capital to his children, rather than mating with many women
to increase the number of children. In other words, the increase in skill inequality
among women led to the decline of polygyny.1
Previous papers do not provide a comprehensive explanation for the phenom-
enon. This follows from the following observations: rst, the majority of primary
care givers for children are still women. Second, there is a substantial income in-
equality in many advanced countries (Krueger et al., 2008; Piketty et al., 2003).
Finally, there are modern societies with low level of skill inequality among women
such as Nordic countries (Harkness, 2010). The distinctive mark of this study is that
the hypothesis is based on a common feature of all modern industrialized countries,
the increase of labor income over the course of development. The hypothesis can ex-
plain the disappearance of polygynous mating even in the absence of skill inequality
among women, without changing child care roles, and even in the presence of high
income inequality.
Moreover, a common feature of the existing studies in the related literature is to
focus on changes in the demand for females. Lagerlof (2005) illustrates decreasing
quantity of demand as a result of the decline in income inequality among men.
Both Becker (1991) and Gould et al. (2008) explain the nonexistence of polygyny in
advanced economies with mens demand shift from quantity of children to quality
of children, although each of them presents a di¤erent mechanism. This paper
1.This issue is also a common research eld for anthropology and sociology. In
anthropology literature, Melotti (1981) explains the transition to monogamy as a
result of evolution. He argues that monogamy mating is evolutionary superior to
polygyny when considering altruism among children. MacDonald (1990), Betzig
(1986) and Alexander (1987) argue that this phenomenon is the result of egali-
tarianism or the need for cohesion in democratic - industrialized countries where
division of labor or rule of lawis prominent. In a recent paper, Lagelo¤ (2010)
extends and formalizes ideas discussed in Alexander (1987). In sociology literature,
Kazanawa and Still (1999) assert that women choose to marry polygynously when
wealth inequality among men is high and choose monogamy if the inequality declined
su¢ ciently.
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is the rst to introduce a supply-side explanation for the phenomenon. I show
that the virtual disappearance of polygyny and the presence of the quantity-quality
trade-o¤ for children arise from the increasing cost of polygyny with the increase of
labor income. Hence, the hypothesis brings a new perspective and complements the
previous studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Sect. 3 examines the model and presents the results. Sect. 4 analyzes robustness of
the theory. In this section, I show that the main result extends for partial female
labor force participation and discuss the implications of female autonomy. Sect. 5
then provides a concluding summary.
1.2 The Model
I consider a static general equilibrium of marriage market with continuum of
men and women.2 Population sizes of both genders are equal and normalized to 1.
The economy produces a single homogeneous good, using e¢ ciency units of labor
as its sole input. Output of a man and a woman is equal to, h, which is exogenously
given and equivalent to human capital of a person. Human capital could be any
skill which makes a person more productive in the labor market.3 For simplicity, I
normalize the cost of human capital investment to zero.4
Marriage occurs upon the consent of a man and a woman. Marriage in the
model can be thought of as an agreement between the husband and the wife over
the division of household resources among them and their children. A man can
marry with a woman if he provides her with the equilibrium utility level, to be
described in more detail below, determined in the competitive marriage market, uw.
Marriage is not restricted to monogamy. However, since the analysis focuses on
polygyny and monogamy, I specify the utility functions so that staying single and
polyandry mating are not possible in equilibrium.5
2. In the Appendix C, I show that the results also carry over to a dynamic
overlapping model with innite horizon.
3. In the model economy, all women participate in the labor force. However, in
Section 4, I show that the main result also extends to the partial female labor force
participation.
4. Instead, one can consider that the human capital investment is costly, but the
return of the human capital investment is su¢ ciently high that parents choose to
invest in their childrens human capital.
5. Polyandry marriage is the mating of a woman with plural men at the same
time.
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Men and women have similar preferences. Each man and woman gets utility
from consumption, cm and cw respectively, the number and the total income of own
children. Specically, he (she) gets utility from human capital, h, of both sons and
daughters. However, each parent gets utility from the total bequests left to sons
only.6 The bequest left from the father and from the mother are denoted by, bm and
bw, respectively.
A central assumption of my model is that time spent together with the mate
(emotional and sexual interaction) is a normal good for agents and the amount of
marital interaction negatively depends on the number of co-wives in the household.
There is a substantial empirical literature supporting this assumption. For exam-
ple, estimates for joint leisure consumption by couples indicate that both men and
women demand spending time together with their spouses (Hamermesh, 2002). Sim-
ilarly, Sullivan (1996), Hallberg (2003), Jenkins and Osberg (2005), Connelly and
Kimmel (2009) nd evidence of this desire for spending time with ones spouse.7 The
literature on marital happiness and marital stability also provides evidence for the
causal a¤ect of amount of marital interaction on marital happiness (White, 1983;
Hill, 1988; Zuo, 1992 and references therein). To simplify the analysis, I specify
this assumption so that the di¤erence between a womans utility derived from time
spending with her mate in monogamous mating and that of in polygynous marriage
is constant, denoted by  2 <+.8
Men choose their quantity of children implicitly by choosing how many wives to
marry, n. In order to simplify the model, I follow Becker (1991) and assume that n
6.The phylogenetic approach argues that parents transfer greater amount of
wealth to their sons in order to maximize their reproductive-success (Hartung et
al., 1982). The specied utility functions in the model can be considered a reduced
form of a more general utility function where agents care about their reproductive
success. Although in the model, the gender inequality in bequests is in extreme
form, relaxing this assumption does not change the results of the paper as long as
male biased inequality in bequests is present.
7. Parallel to these, several empirical studies also indicate that in polygynous
marriages, co-wives compete, conict for and are jealous of sexual and emotional
attention of their husbands (Meekers and Franklin, 1995; Mulder, 1990; Farrell,
1987; Solway, 1990; Aluka and Aransiola, 2003).
8.This constant utility di¤erence can be considered as the di¤erence between
a womans utility derived from the amount of marital interaction when she is the
sole woman in the household and when she shares the amount of interaction with
her mate with another woman ( the lowest level of the utility di¤erence when the
number of women in the model is assumed to be discrete). Nonetheless, I show in
Appendix B that the qualitative results of the model remain same when one assumes
that (all else equal) a womans utility is logarithmic function of time spent together
with her mate and men divide their limited time equally among their wives.
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is a continuous variable. Contrary to males, females are biologically constrained to
have two children.9 Although women cannot choose the number of their mates, they
can choose whether to enter into a monogamous mating or a polygynous mating.
The mating decision of a woman is denoted by x 2 f0; 1g, where x = 0 if the mating
is monogamous, and x = 1 if the mating is polygynous (n > 1).
In particular, preferences of men are represented by the following utility function
ln cm + ln [n (2h+ bw + bm)] , (1)
whereas a womans utility function is given by
ln cw + ln (2h+ bw + bm)  x (2)
A woman earns income in the labor market (Iw = h). Moreover, she receives
a transfer from her husband, y. On the other hand, a mans income is the sum of
bequests received from his parents and his labor income. There are two groups of
men according to their income levels, rich with income Ir and poor with income Ip.
Proportion of poor is given by  and that of rich is given by (1  ).
A womans and a mans budget constraints are given by
cw + bw = Iw + y (3)
cm + n (bm + y) = Im, (4)
where Im 2 fIr; Ipg
Finally, the bequest decisions of men and women are sequential. First, the
husband decides the bequest level per son, bm, and the income transfer level per wife,
y. In the second stage, each wife takes the bequest and income transfer decision of
the husband as given and then decides the amount of bequest, bw, to her son. In
order to simplify the analysis by avoiding corner solutions, I allow negative values
of bequest left by woman, which may be interpreted as an income transfer from son
to his mother after he starts to work in the labor market.10
9.The size of the upper bound on the womens fertility is not critical. Thus, the
number of children of a woman can be assumed to be more than two. The results
are valid as long as there exists a limit on the womens fertility.
10.Compared to simultaneous decision making, this bequest decision pattern is
more in line with patriarchy. So, I kept intentionally the pattern in this form.
However, changing the pattern does not a¤ect the results.
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1.3 Analysis
Each woman chooses her consumption, cw, the bequest transfer to her son, bw,
and the type of mating to enter into, x, to maximize (2) subject to (3), given the
amount of income transfer and the bequest left to her son by her husband:
max
fx; cw; bwg
ln cw + ln (2h+ bw + bm)  x s.t. cw + bw = Iw + y
Each man chooses his consumption, cm, the number of wives, n, the amount of
income transfer to each wife, y, and the bequests for each of his sons, bm, to maximize
(1) subject to (4) and non-negativity constraints, given womens equilibrium utility,
uw:
max
fcm; n; y; bmg
ln cm + ln [n (2h+ bw + bm)]
s.t. cm + n (bm + y) = Im, bm; y  0, ln cw + ln (2h+ bw + bm)  x  uw
The last constraint can be considered as the participation constraint of a woman to
enter into a polygynous mating.
Finally, market clearance implies that all women are married in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In polygynous mating, the sum of the income transfer to each woman and
bequest to her son is higher than the sum of those in a monogamous mating. The
di¤erence is equal to
2 exp
uw
2

exp


2

  1

Proof. Substituting (3) into (2) and deriving the rst-order condition with respect
to bw yield
bw =
Iw + y   2h  bm
2
(5)
By substituting (5) and (3) into the participation constraint, one can rewrite
this constraint in the following form:
2 ln

Iw + y + 2h+ bm
2

  x  uw (6)
In the polygynous equilibrium, mens optimization requires that (6) holds with
equality. Thus, (6) and x 2 f0; 1g together imply that
y + bm = 2Uk   Iw   2h if n > 1 (7)
y + bm = 2U   Iw   2h if n  1 (8)
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where U  exp(uw
2
) and k  exp(
2
). (7) and (8) represent the sum of the income
transfer to each woman and the bequest to her son in a polygynous mating and
the sum of those in a monogamous mating, respectively. Subtracting (8) from (7)
produces the result.
The intuition underlying Lemma 1 is straightforward. A man who marries polyg-
ynously provides less amount of marital interaction to each of his wives compared
to a man in monogamous mating. Hence the man in polygynous mating has to
compensate for each of his wives forgone utility that results from sharing him with
co-wives. There are two ways he can do this. He could o¤er a higher income transfer
to each wife or a higher amount of bequest to her son than they would receive in a
monogamous mating. The di¤erence can be interpreted as the cost of polygynous
mating for men.
Figure I
Womens utility level vs. the cost of polygyny
Figure I represents the relation between the cost of polygyny and womens equi-
librium utility level, uw. It shows that as uw increases, men need to o¤er higher
amount of income transfer to a woman, y, and bequest, bm, for her son in order
to compensate for her forgone utility in polygyny, . The cost of polygynous mat-
ing increases with uw at an increasing rate. As a result, any factor that improves
womens utility also increases the cost of polygynous mating for men. Figure I shows
that concavity and monotonicity properties of utility functions, which are standard
assumptions, imply this result.
Lemma 2 Rich men have at least as many wives as poor men have.
Proof. After substituting (4), (5) and (6) into (1), mens maximization problem
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boils down to
max
fng
ln [Im   n (2Ukx   Iw   2h)] + ln (nUkx) s.t. bm; y  0 (9)
Deriving the rst-order condition with respect to n produces the following conditions
after rearranging:
n =
8><>:
Im
2 (2Uk   Iw   2h) if n > 1
Im
2 (2U   Iw   2h) if n  1
(10)
In the polygynous equilibrium, the characterization of n together with the assump-
tion Ir > Ip produces the result that a rich man has more wives than a poor man has.
Observing that every man has one wife in the monogamous equilibrium completes
the proof.
The cost of polygyny and the competition among males for women cause that
if polygynous mating exists in equilibrium, only men with adequate resources can
a¤ord it. The assumption of balanced sex ratio in the model implies that only rich
men can marry polygynously.
Lemma 2 is in line with Becker (1973), Wright (1994), and Gould et al. (2008)
and is also consistent with existing evidence. For example, Grossbards (1976) em-
pirical study of polygyny at Maiduguri documents that there is a positive correlation
between the degree of polygyny and male income. A similar study by Mulder (1990)
in Kenya also supports this prediction.
The next proposition presents two important factors that a¤ect the degree of
polygyny.
Proposition 1 The degree of polygyny is
i) positively associated with income inequality among males,
ii) negatively associated with the income level of women.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
The intuition behind the rst statement of Proposition 1 is the following. Holding
the income of poor men constant, an increase in the income level of rich men enlarges
their choice sets. Concavity and monotonicity of the utility function imply that rich
men are willing to increase the number of wives. On the other hand, holding the
income of rich men constant, a decrease in poor mens income leads them to leave
smaller bequests to their sons and to transfer fewer resources to their wives. This
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makes monogamous mating less appealing for women. As a result, more women
engage in polygynous mating.
This prediction of Proposition 1 is in line with existing evidence. In their em-
pirical study, Kazanawa et al. (1999) conclude that income inequality among males
signicantly increases the degree of polygyny. Moreover, anecdotal evidence doc-
umented by Lagerlo¤ (2005) also supports the prediction of the rst statement of
Proposition 1.
The proposition also states that the income of women and the degree of polygyny
are inversely related. As the income of women increases, the marginal utility of extra
economic resources provided in polygynous mating diminishes. As a result, rich men
have to increase the sum of income transfer and the amount of bequest, if they want
to marry polygynously. The intuition for this statement follows from Lemma 1. As I
show in Lemma 1, anything that increases womens equilibrium utility also increases
the cost of polygyny. Thus, the increase of womens income increases the cost of
polygyny through its e¤ect on uw.
The association between womens socioeconomic position and the degree of
polygyny has been widely conrmed. The empirical studies of Grossbard (1976),
Ware (1979), and Armstrong (1993) support the statement regarding the relation
between the income level of women and the degree of polygyny.
Proposition 2 The degree of polygyny declines with h and if h is su¢ ciently high,
polygynous mating is nonexistent in equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
Proposition 2 states the main result of the paper. Above a critical level of
labor income, monogamy turns out to be the unique mating type in equilibrium.11
There are two channels in which the increase in labor income decreases the degree
of polygyny, although each of these channels alone might lead to the disappearance
of polygyny.
The rst one is its e¤ect through the increase of labor income of women. As I
establish in the second statement of Proposition 1, women income and the degree of
polygyny are inversely related. As womens income increases, so do their equilibrium
utility level and the cost of polygyny (See Figure I).
Second, an increase in labor income leads women to anticipate that their sons
will earn a higher income in the labor market. As a result, the benet that women
11.The threshold of labor income is explicitly given in the Appendix A.
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derive from the total bequest left to their sons diminishes. This e¤ect coerces men
to provide higher economic advantages in order to compensate for womens utility
loss from polygynous mating. Hence, the cost of polygyny increases and the degree
of polygyny falls.
The second channel resembles a well-known phenomenon: the quantity-quality
trade-o¤ for children. However, in contrast to the existing literature, the shift from
the quantity to quality in this setting occurs due to supply-side reasons. Both Becker
(1991) and Gould et al. (2008) argue that as the return on human capital increases,
men prefer to have fewer but higher quality children. As a result, the degree of
polygyny falls. On the other hand, Proposition 2 states that the decline arises from
the increasing cost of polygyny rather than the demand shift of men.
To summarize, one reason that advanced countries are more monogamous than
less developed ones is the di¤erences in the level of labor income among these coun-
tries. Cross country comparisons indicate that countries with a high degree of polyg-
yny are also the ones with the lowest GDP per capita and average labor income levels
(Tertilt, 2005). The hypothesis is also is also supported by empirical evidence in
the existing literature. Tertilt (2006) reports that several measures of women em-
powerment are negatively correlated with the degree of polygyny. Kazanawa et al.
(1999) test the relation between the degree of polygyny and GDP per capita using
cross-cultural data that includes 127 countries. Their result shows that an increase
in GDP per capita signicantly reduces the degree of polygyny. Since GDP per
capita highly correlates with labor income, the authors conclude that their paper
lends empirical support to the contention that the increase in labor income reduces
the degree of polygyny.
1.4 Robustness
In the previous section, I show the transition from polygynous equilibrium to
monogamous equilibrium under assumptions of full female labor force participation
and ultimate female autonomy in marriage decisions. Although these assumptions
are innocuous for current advanced countries, one can question their validity in the
pre-industrial world. Nonetheless, I argue that the mechanism behind the main
result is still e¤ective even when these assumptions are relaxed, as I show below.
First, I investigate whether the main result hold if only a fraction of females
participates in the labor force. For this purpose, I modify the model by assuming an
exogenous female labor force participation rate, ", which is less than unity. The next
11
proposition states that the main result of the paper extends under the assumption
of partial female labor force participation.12
Proposition 3 For all " 2 [0; 1), the degree of polygyny declines with h and if h is
su¢ ciently high, polygynous mating is nonexistent in equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
The intuition behind the Proposition 3 follows from the discussion in section
2. Even if some females do not participate in the labor force, an increase in labor
income still increases the equilibrium utility level of all women. Because, as labor
income increases, women anticipate that labor income of their sons will increase
and so the benet of the total bequest left to sons diminishes for women. In other
words, the quantity versus quality channel is e¤ective even when some females do
not work. Moreover, an increase in labor income increases the utility level of women
who participate in the labor force. As argued with Lemma 1, anything that increases
equilibrium utility level of women also increases the cost of polygyny. Hence, the
ndings are robust to the labor force participation of women.
The mechanism described in the paper is still e¤ective in the absence of ultimate
female autonomy in marital choices, as long as at least one of the following assump-
tions holds: (i) women have some degree of decision power over their marital choices
or (ii) parents have some degree of altruism towards their daughters. The validity
of the hypothesis under these assumptions is more apparent. Thus, I discuss the
mechanism without presenting a formal proof. As it is in the main model, womens
marginal utility derived from the economic resources provided in polygynous mating
still diminishes with the increase of labor income. Since the two mechanisms in the
model (the increase of labor income of women and their sons) still have the same
e¤ects on womens utility. Here, the key role of assumptions (i) and (ii) is that
under either assumption, womens declining incentives to enter into a polygynous
mating, accompanied with the increase of labor income, will be reected in marital
decisions. Consequently, the cost of polygynous mating for men increases with an
increase in labor income and once again, the degree of polygyny being negatively
correlated with labor income remains as a result.
Moreover, these assumptions are justied with evidence. There are supportive
studies showing that women exert considerable inuence over their marital decisions.
As an instance, in Togo where more than 40% of women have been involved in
polygynous union, it is documented that over 70% of women have decision power over
12.Here, I do not provide a theory of female labor force participation. Such an
analysis is beyond the scope of his study.
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their marital decisions (Gage, 1995). Similarly, parental altruism, that can provide
alignment of interests on marital choices between daughters and their parents, is
also supported by the existing studies. For example, in her analysis of 133 societies,
Small (1992) concludes that the interests of females in an arranged marriage are not
necessarily di¤erent from interests of their parents.
Hence, the main conclusion of the paper holds even when I relax the assumptions
regarding female autonomy and labor force participation. The results crucially follow
from concavity and monotonicity properties of utility functions and womens demand
for marital interaction, which implies women prefer monogamy over polygyny all
else equal. The rst two assumptions are standard in economic theory and the
last assumption is well-supported by existing empirical evidence. Consequently,
the underlying mechanism works in a more general environment as long as these
assumptions are preserved.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper examines why advanced countries are more monogamous than less
developed countries. I build a general equilibrium model of marriage market to
analyze the phenomenon and show that polygynous marriage in a society disappears,
if labor income in that economy is su¢ ciently high.
A common feature of developed economies is that the average labor income in
these countries is much higher than it is in less developed countries. I argue that this
characteristic is the main reason of the variations in the degree of polygyny among
advanced and less developed countries. I further assert that through the process of
industrialization and economic development, the increase of labor income has led to
the virtual disappearance of polygyny in advanced countries.
The theory is simple and intuitive. I assume that a woman values time spent
with her spouse. If she involves in polygyny, she enjoys less utility due to less
amount of marital interaction compared to she would do in monogamous mating.
Thus, in order to persuade women to enter into a polygynous mating, men have
to o¤er more economic resources than those provided in a monogamous mating.
These extra payments constitute the cost of polygynous mating for men. The cost
of polygynous mating for men increases with the increase of labor income through
two channels: rst, as labor income of women increases, the marginal benet of
the economic advantages provided in a polygynous union diminishes. As a result,
women demand more to enter into a polygynous mating. Second, the increase of
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labor income decreases the marginal contribution of bequests to the total income.
Thus, the incentives of women, who care income of their sons, to join in a polygynous
mating diminish, as well. Consequently, an increase in the labor income, which is
equal to the human capital return in the model, leads rich mens number of wives
and children to decline. This second channel implies that the decline in quantity of
children, accompanied with the increase of quality of them, arises from the supply-
side changes, rather than from mens demand shift.
Moreover, the underlying mechanism yields several predictions. First, I estab-
lish that the number of wives a man has is a positive function of his income. Since
polygynous mating is costly for men, only the ones with adequate resources can
a¤ord it. Moreover, income inequality among men determines the degree of compe-
tition for women. Thus, income inequality among men is positively associated with
the degree of polygyny. Furthermore, the degree of polygyny is negatively related
to the income level of women. This results from the increasing cost of polygynous
mating with increase of womens income. All these predictions are consistent with
the existing empirical ndings, as is the main nding of the paper.
Finally, this paper emphasizes that womens role is as important as mens role in
the determination of observed marriage types in a society. Hence, the results suggest
that policies favoring women, such as encouraging their labor force participation,
subsidizing female education and securing more gender equal inheritance should also
be considered as alternative instruments for the prevention of polygyny.
1.6 Appendix A: Proofs
Notation 1 Let n be an element of the set fnr; npg where nr and np are the numbers
of wives of a rich man and a poor man, respectively. Let L and M denote the
exogenous bequests received by a rich and a poor man, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1. Substituting (10) into the market clearing condition
(np + (1  )nr = 1) produces the following equation.
U =
(k + 1) (4h+ 2Iw) + kIp + (1  ) Ir 
p
A
8k
(A-1)
where A  [(1   )Ir   kIp   (k   1)(4h + 2Iw)]2 + 4IrkIp(1   ). It gives an
expression of U in terms of the exogenous variables for the polygynous equilibrium.
Notice that although U has two roots, the root with negative
p
A violates (10).
Therefore, the positive root represents U .
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Substituting (A1) into (10) yields
n =
Im
(k+1)(4h+2Iw)+kIp+(1 )Ir+
p
A
2
  2Iw   4h
if n > 1
In Lemma 2, I establish that if the equilibrium is polygynous, only rich men
marry polygynously. Thus, the number of a rich mans wives is equal to the following:
nr =
Ir
(k+1)(4h+2Iw)+kIp+(1 )Ir+
p
A
2
  2Iw   4h
(A-2)
Taking the derivative of nr with respect to Ir and Ip shows that @nr=@Ir > 0
and @nr=@Ip < 0. Therefore, nr is negatively related to income inequality.
Taking the derivative of nr with respect to Iw yields @nr=@Iw < 0 which proves
the second statement of Proposition 1.13
Proof of Proposition 2. First, I need to show that @nr=@h < 0. After replacing
Iw with its equivalent h, Ir with L+ h and Ip with M + h, nr can be written as the
following:
nr =
L+ h
4Uk   6h (A-3)
Similarly, the number of wives of a poor man in the polygynous equilibrium is equal
to
np =
M + h
4U   6h (A-4)
The exact expression of the derivative, @nr=@h, is quite complex and it is hard to
determine the sign of it. Thus, I prove that @nr=@h < 0 with a proof by contradic-
tion.
First notice that @nr=@h and @np=@h have opposite signs. Because the pro-
portions of rich and poor men and the sum of nr and np is constant. Now, for a
contradiction, assume that @nr=@h > 0. This implies
@np
@h
=
2U + 3M   2(M + h)(@U
@h
)
2(3h  2U)2 < 0 (A-5)
(A5) implies
@U
@h
>
2U + 3M
2(M + h)
(A-6)
13.The derivates are calculated with Maple and the program codes are available.
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Taking the derivative of nr with respect to h yields
@nr
@h
=
 2(L+ h)(@U
@h
) + 2kU + 3L
2(2Uk   3h)2 > 0 (A-7)
(A7) implies
@U
@h
<
2Uk + 3L
2k(L+ h)
(A-8)
(A6) and (A8) together yield
2U + 3M
2(M + h)
<
2Uk + 3L
2k(L+ h)
(A-9)
However, (A1) implies that U > 6(k + 1)h=8k. Also, k > 1 implies (L   M) >
(L  kM). These two properties together result in
2U + 3M
2(M + h)

2Uk + 3L
2k(L+ h)
(A-10)
which is a contradiction. Equating @nr=@h to zero yields a similar contradiction.
Hence, the sign of the derivative, @nr=@h, is negative.
In the second part of the proof, I show that if h is higher than a critical level, the
marriage market equilibrium is monogamous. (10) together with Lemma 2 imply
the following two conditions.
Ir
2
> 2Uk   Iw   2h (A-11)
Ip
2
 2U   Iw   2h (A-12)
Multiplying each side of (A12) with k and combining it with (A11) yield
L+ h
2
+ h+ 2h > 2Uk 

M + h
2
+ h+ 2h

k (A-13)
Hence, in the polygynous equilibrium, in addition to (10), (A13) should hold. Oth-
erwise, nr cannot be larger than 1. Now, rearranging (A13) yields
L  kM
7 (k   1) > h (A-14)
Consequently, if h  (L   kM)=7(k   1), the marriage market equilibrium cannot
be polygynous. This proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the previous proposition, I establish that in the case
with full female labor force participation (" = 1), if h is su¢ ciently high, polygynous
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mating is nonexistent in equilibrium. Now, let female labor force participation rate
to be zero. This corresponds to equating Iw to zero in (A3) and yields
nr =
Ir
(k+1)4h+k(M+h)+(1 )(L+h)+pD
2
  4h
(A-15)
where D  [(1  )Ir   kIp   (k   1)(4h)]2 + 4IrkIp(1  ).
Taking the derivative of nr with respect to h yields @nr=@h < 0. This shows
that the degree of polygyny falls with the increase of h even if female labor force
participation is assumed to be zero. Similarly, equating Iw to zero in (A11) and (A12)
produces a necessary condition for the existence of the polygynous equilibrium when
none of the females participates in the labor force.
L+ h
2
+ 2h > 2Uk 

M + h
2
+ 2h

k (A-16)
Rearranging (A16) yields
L  kM
5 (k   1) > h (A-17)
(A17) shows that in the case of zero female labor force participation, if h  (L  
kM)=5(k   1), the marriage market equilibrium is monogamous. Hence, for all
" 2 [0; 1], there exists h 2 <+ such that if h  h, polygynous mating is nonexistent
in equilibrium. This completes the proof.
1.7 Appendix B: SpousesShared Time
In this section, I argue that keeping the di¤erence between utility derived from
the amount of marital interaction in monogamous mating and that of in polygynous
mating constant is harmless. Specically, I show that the qualitative results of the
paper remain same in a model where a womans utility is logarithmic function of
time spent together with her mate and men divide their limited time equally among
their wives.14
14. Since polyandry marriage is ruled out in the model, mens valuation of their
time spent with their wives is normalized to zero. One can consider that a mans
total amount of time spending together with his mates does not change with the
increase of the number of his mates since he devotes his limited time among them.
Nonetheless, relaxing this assumption does not change qualitative results of the
paper, because the channel of increase of the cost of polygyny, accompanied with
the increase of labor income, will still be e¤ective.
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Now, the new utility function of a woman takes the following form:
ln cw + ln (2h+ bw + bm) + ln(
T
n
) (A-18)
where T 2 <+ denotes the amount of a mans time endowment and n denotes the
number of women in the household. Other specications of the main model remain
same. A man can marry with a woman if he provides her with the equilibrium utility
level determined in the competitive marriage market. This implies the following
constraint:
ln cw + ln (2h+ bw + bm) + ln(
T
n
)  uw (A-19)
Substituting (3) and (5) into (A19) yields
ln

Iw + y + 2h+ bm
2n

 uw   ln(T )
2
(A-20)
mens optimization requires that (A20) holds with equality. After arranging, this
implies:
y + bm = 2nV s  Iw   2h (A-21)
where V  exp(uw
2
) and s  exp( ln(T )
2
). (A21) indicates that the sum of the income
transfer to each woman and bequest to her son increases with the number of women
in the household. Hence, in polygynous mating, the sum of the income transfer
to each woman and the bequest to her son is higher than the sum of those in a
monogamous mating. This shows the result stated in Lemma 1 also holds in this
framework.
After substituting (4), (5) and (A21) into (1), mens maximization problem boils
down to
max
n
fln[Im   n(2nV s  Iw   2h)] + ln
 
V sn2
g s.t. bm; y  0 (A-22)
Deriving the rst-order condition with respect to n produces the following conditions
after rearranging:
n =
p
64ImV s+ 9(Iw + 2h)2 + 3(Iw + 2h)
16V s
This yields the following equations:
nr =
p
64IrV s+ 9(Iw + 2h)2 + 3(Iw + 2h)
16V s
(A-23)
np =
p
64IpV s+ 9(Iw + 2h)2 + 3(Iw + 2h)
16V s
(A-24)
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The characterization of n together with the assumption Ir > Ip produces the result
stated in Lemma 2 that in the polygynous equilibrium, a rich man has more wives
than a poor man has.
Substituting (A23) and (A24) into the market clearing condition yields:p
64IpV s+ 9(Iw + 2h)2 + 3(Iw + 2h)
16V s=
+
p
64IrV s+ 9(Iw + 2h)2 + 3(Iw + 2h)
16V s=(1  ) = 1
We can determine the derivative of V with respect to Ip; Ir; Iw by applying implicit
di¤erentiation to the market clearing condition. After that, taking the derivative of
nr with respect to Ip; Ir yields @nr=@Ip < 0 and @nr=@Ir > 0 that shows the degree
of polygyny is positively associated with income inequality among males. Similarly,
taking the derivative of nr with respect to Iw yields @nr=@Iw < 0 that shows the
degree of polygyny is negatively associated with the income level of women. Hence,
the results stated in Proposition 1 are still valid.
After replacing Iw with its equivalent h, Ir with L + h and Ip with M + h, the
equation that characterizes nr can be written as the following:
nr =
p
64(L+ h)V s+ 81h2 + 9h
16V s
After making the same replacements in the market clearing condition and deter-
mining the derivative of V with respect to h by applying implicit di¤erentiation,
the derivative of nr with respect to h results @nr=@h < 0.15 This indicates that
the degree of polygyny declines with the increase in labor income, h. Equating Iw
to zero in (A23) and applying the same technique results that the degree of polyg-
yny declines with the increase in labor income, even none of women participates to
the labor force. Hence, the qualitative results of the paper extends under the new
assumptions.
1.8 Appendix C: Dynamic Extension
In this section, I present a dynamic extension for the model. I show that my
results carry through to a dynamic overlapping generations model with innite hori-
zon. Let superscript t denotes period t and L0 and M0, where L0 > M0, denote the
assets of initial rich and poor, respectively. I assume that h increases with time, i.e.
ht+1 > ht. At time t, a womans income is equal to ht and a mans income is equal
15.The derivates are calculated with Maple and the program codes are available.
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to the sum of the human capital return in that period, ht and the bequests that he
receives from his parents, bt 1w and b
t 1
m , where b
t 1
m 2 fbt 1r , bt 1p g.
First, notice that the results stated in Lemma 1 and 2 and Proposition 1 are
time invariant. Thus, the results are still valid. Moreover, the following equation,
which is counterpart of (A14), shows the necessary condition for the existence of the
polygynous equilibrium in the dynamic model.
Lt 1   kM t 1
7 (k   1) > h
t (A-25)
Substituting (5) into (7) and (8) imply that in the polygynous equilibrium, total
bequests received by rich and poor men at time t are equal to
bt 1w + b
t 1
m = U
t 1k   2ht 1 if nt 1 > 1 (A-26)
bt 1w + b
t 1
m = U
t 1   2ht 1 if nt 1  1 (A-27)
Multiplying (A27) with k and subtracting the outcome from (A26) yield
Lt 1   kM t 1 = 2(k   1)ht 1 (A-28)
(A28) implies that at time t, the necessary condition for the polygynous equilibrium,
(A25), is not satised and as a result, polygynous mating disappears. I should
note that the pass to the monogamous equilibrium is rapid. After initial period,
polygynous mating disappears. However, the pace of the transition depends on the
structure of wealth transmission and specication of the utility functions.
Next, I show that the endogenous income inequality preserves in both polygynous
and monogamous equilibrium. First, in the polygynous equilibrium, (A26) and
(A27) imply that income inequality among males at time t is equal to U t 1(k  
1)=(U t 1   2ht 1 + ht) and it is greater than zero. In the monogamous equilibrium,
solution of womens problem results
bt 1w =
ht 1 + yt 1   2ht   bt 1m
2
(A-29)
and given n = 1, the solution of mens problem implies
yt 1 + bt 1m =
I t 1m   ht 1   2ht
2
(A-30)
Substituting (A29) into (A30) yields
bt 1w + b
t 1
m =
ht 1   6ht + I t 1m
4
(A-31)
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This shows that if the equilibrium is monogamous, the inequality in period t is equal
to
 
I t 1r   I t 1p

=
 
4I tp

and once again it is greater than zero. Hence, I establish
that the endogenously determined income inequality preserves both in polygynous
and monogamous equilibrium.
The simple model that I present above does not provide a good representation
of the distribution and intergenerational transmission of wealth. One need a more
sophisticated model to do this. One possibility is to allow for bequest inequalities
among sons, i.e., modelling primogeniture.16 However, my analysis is on marriage
types and not on the transmission of wealth. Also, this simple model still shows
that inferences of the static model hold in the dynamic extension. Hence, in order
to preserve simplicity, I kept the model intentionally in this simple form.
16.Primogeniture is the custom that the eldest son receives nearly all of total
bequest left. See DeLong (2003), Bertocchi (2006) for an extensive discussion of the
issue.
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CHAPTER 2
THE MASQUERADE BALL OF THE CEOs AND THE MASK OF
EXCESSIVE RISK17
2.1 Introduction
Excessive risk taking by the CEOs of large nancial cooperations is widely be-
lieved to have played a great role in the economic and nancial crisis of 2008-2009
(Blinder, 2009). Of the executives and commentators surveyed in the nancial ser-
vices sector, 73% consider excessive risk taking to be one of the crucial factors that
triggered the crisis (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). G-20 leaders announced their
commitment in legislating the necessary changes to minimize excessive risk taking.
The Basel II framework has been amended to account for motives to take excessive
risk. The Dodd-Frank Act prohibited certain compensation arrangements in order
to discourage inappropriate risk taking by nancial institutions in the US. What
motivates CEOs to employ excessively risky projects? Two well-known explana-
tions are limited liability, which provides insurance to CEOs against the downward
risks of their project choice, and compensation schemes that encourage risk taking
(e.g., convex compensation schemes). In this paper, we provide an additional reason
for why there might be excessive risk taking in the market even in the absence of
limited liability and compensation schemes that encourage risk taking. We argue
that a CEOs career concerns regarding potential termination give her incentive to
try to improve the markets expectation about her managerial ability. We show that
a CEO can achieve this goal by choosing excessively risky projects and that, un-
der certain conditions, explicit incentives provided by optimal linear compensation
contracts cannot prevent CEOs from choosing such projects.
We build a principal-agent framework in which a (risk-neutral) rm operates for
two periods. We initially assume that there are two types of (risk-neutral) CEOs,
high- and low-ability, who are equally likely in the population. Neither the rm
nor the CEO knows the ability of the CEO in the beginning (in the asymmetric
information section, the CEO knows her ability). The CEO chooses the project
to be undertaken by the rm from a pool of investment projects. Projects di¤er
in their probabilities of failure and potential returns, and there is a high risk-high
return / low risk-low return technology in the sense that a project with a higher
17.This chapter is a joint work with Eren Inci
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probability of failure has a higher return in the good state and higher loss in the bad
state (as in bank loans or CDOs which are split into di¤erent tranches according to
their default risk and returns). Among the potential projects, there are excessively
risky ones with lower expected returns and higher probabilities of failure, some even
with negative NPVs which are in fact chosen in equilibrium. In the end, the rm
may land in one of the two possible states (good or bad) and pays the optimal linear
compensation contract that allows for any combination of xed wages and stocks,
so there is no compensation arrangement that increase risk appetite, such as convex
compensation schemes. A loss is incurred by the CEO if the output realization is
negative, so there is no limited liability.
If the rm believes that the ability of the CEO is below average at the end
of the rst period, it res her and hires a new CEO, whose ability is expected to
be average in the population. This layo¤ risk is the source of the CEOs career
concerns and it gives her incentive to improve the markets expectation about her
ability.18 Suppose, for the moment, that the CEO knows her ability (as we do in
the asymmetric information section) and it is low. In such as case, she can simply
gambleby choosing an excessively risky project. When the good state realizes,
the rm cannot be sure if the observed output is produced by a low- or high-ability
CEO. However, it has to statistically conclude that the CEO is more likely to be a
high-ability one in the bad state as the probability of success is lower with excessively
risky projects. When the bad state realizes, the rm infers the type of the CEO and
res her. But, if she did not choose an excessively risky project, she would be red
in any output realization. This means that she can lower her probability of being
red by choosing an excessively risky project.
More importantly, a CEO who does not know her ability also has the same
motivation. Because she takes into account the possibility that her type might be
low, she tries to prevent the rm from perfectly inferring her type. In our model,
she can do so by choosing the excessively risky project with which the good-state
18. It is noteworthy that risk-taking decisions interact with layo¤ risk and com-
pensation incentives in practice. Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) empirically
show that layo¤ risk and compensation e¤ects matter in managersrisk-taking de-
cisions. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) mention that avoiding a possible layo¤ is the
most important career concern. Other papers supporting this hypothesis include
Fama (1980), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997), Bloom
and Milkovich (1998), Mehran, Nogler, and Schwartz (1998), Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia (1998), Eckbo and Thorburn (2003), Hong and Kubik (2003), Clarke and
Subramanian (2006), Chakraborty, Sheikh, and Subramanian (2007), and Larraza-
Kintana et al. (2007). The literature also shows that CEO turnover is closely
related to the peer performance (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; DeFond and Park,
1999; Kaplan and Minton, 2012).
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output of a low-ability CEO coincides with the bad-state output of a high-ability
one. When the rm observes this overlappedoutput, it cannot know exactly which
ability type in fact produced this output. However, because the probability of failure
is higher with an excessively risky project, the rm believes that the observed output
is more likely to be the bad-state realization of a high-ability CEO than the good-
state realization of a low-ability one. Consequently, the rms expectation about the
CEOs ability will be higher than average even though each type is ex ante equally
likely, which means that the CEO is not red in such an output realization. In fact,
by following this strategy, she is red only if she turns out to be a low-ability CEO
in the bad state.
We show that the strategy of overlapping the outputs by choosing an excessively
risky project minimizes the probability of being red when the di¤erence between
the two possible abilities is neither too high nor too low. Yet, minimizing the
probability of being red is not automatically an equilibrium. It is so when the
CEOs compensation benet she derives by choosing the optimally risky project in
the rst period is dominated in expected payo¤ by the career benet she derives
by choosing an excessively risky project to minimize her probability of being red.
In such a case, excessively risky projects are undertaken in equilibrium under the
optimal linear compensation contract. This sheds light on the ongoing debate about
the (desperate) role of regulation of compensation structures to prevent excessive
risk taking.
Policy debates emphasize the CEOsresponsibility in the ine¢ ciently high levels
of risk taken by large nancial corporations. Yet, we show that, in addition to cases
in which the rm involuntarily allows the CEO to choose excessively risky projects,
there are also cases in which it voluntarily allows her to do so. In the former case, the
rm allows the CEO to choose an excessively risky project because no compensation
contract, not even providing the whole return of the project to the CEO, can have
her choose the optimally risky project. However, in the latter case, although having
the CEO choose the optimally risky project could be protable for the rm, letting
her choose an excessively risky project is even more protable. This is ine¢ cient
from the point of view of society, as the return from an excessively risky project has
negative net present value. Thus, shareholders sometimes share the responsibility
of ine¢ cient levels of risk in the rm.
Our results hold even when CEOs are risk averse. We further show that exces-
sively risky projects are undertaken even when there is a continuum of ability types.
This case also illustrates an inverse U-shaped relationship between the unobserved
ability of the CEO and her layo¤ risk. Among the below-average CEOs, a higher-
ability one is more likely to be red than a lower-ability one, while above-average
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CEOs face no layo¤ risk. Finally, we show that our results are robust to changes in
informational assumptions by illustrating that excessively risky projects are under-
taken in equilibrium when CEOs privately know their types. Our explanation for
excessive risk taking is not limited-liability based, as there is no limited liability for
the CEO in the model. That is, in our setting, a CEO does not take higher risks
simply because limited liability protects her from downward risks, which is already
a well-known explanation. As a matter of fact, incorporating limited liability to our
setting would increase CEOsrisk appetite. Our explanation is not based on con-
vex compensation schemes, the other popular explanation for excessive risk taking,
either, as we do not allow for them in the optimal contract.
We now explain how our paper relates to prior work. A large body of litera-
ture, pioneered by Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1982/1999), analyzes how career
concerns a¤ect the behavior of agents. Holmstrom (1982/1999) nds that, since
investing in a project carries the risk of ones type being discovered, a risk-averse
manager behaves overly conservatively by not investing in risky projects at all.
Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) elaborate on this idea further and show that
conservatism can be xed if the shareholders can o¤er a downward rigid wage. Build-
ing on Holmstroms ndings, the literature that followed has focused on managerial
conservatism in a broad sense (see, e.g., Narayanan, 1985; Stei,n 1988; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1989; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Zwiebel,
1995; Nohel and Todd, 2005; and Malcomson, 2011). Contrary to this literature, we
show that managers with career concerns (even risk-averse ones) have an incentive
to choose excessively risky projects.
Some papers focus on the possibility of signaling of managerial ability. Huberman
and Kandel (1993) analyze the reputation concerns of money managers who might
possibly overinvest in a risky asset to signal their ability. Huddart (1999) shows that
an explicit performance fee may mitigate excessive risk taking of investment advisors
who have reputational concerns. Unlike the signaling literature, in our setting the
CEO is trying not to aunt her type but to rather add bias to the markets inferences
about it. In that sense, our mechanism is closer to the signal-jamming literature,
in which the agent tries to jam the signalabout her type (Fudenberg and Tirole
1986).
The recent literature on CEO turnover analyzes the impact of performance risk
on the rms ability to infer the unknown ability of its CEO. For example, Bushman,
Dai, and Wang (2010) analyze whether rm-specic or systematic risk increases
turnover in a setting where risk is exogenous. Instead, we look at the implications
of CEO turnover for risk taking when both the risk choice of the CEO and the
turnover decision of the rm are endogenous. Hu et al. (2011) nd a U-shaped
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relationship between the managers risk choice and her prior relative performance
among her peers. We nd a similar inverse U-shaped relationship between the CEOs
ability and her layo¤ risk. In our setting, while above-average CEOs face no layo¤
risk, among below-average ones, lower-ability CEOs have lower layo¤ risk than do
higher-ability ones.
The type of statistical bias that managers try to add into the markets inference
about their unknown abilities appears in various ways in the literature. In Milbourn,
Shockley, and Thakor (2001), in order to alter the markets assessment about her
ability, the manager distorts the probabilities of reputational states that are observed
and not observed by overly investigating potential projects. In Scharfstein and Stein
(1990), the motivation of the manager is to minimize reputational risk by following
the crowd. The closest in spirit to our paper is Hermalin (1993). Because the project
choice is observable in Hermalin (1993), a manager can decrease the variance of the
posterior estimate of her ability by choosing the riskiest project in terms of variance,
as a result of which the principal puts more weight on his prior assessment of the
CEOs ability. The intuition for this result can be easily seen with an extreme
example. A manager can minimize reputational risk by investing in the projects
with innite risk, as this would be no more informative than not investing at all.
In our setting, rather than a¤ecting the weights on assessments, the CEO is able to
inuence the posterior assessment itself.
The paper is organized as follows. Section outlines the model. Section analyzes
the case in which the CEOs managerial ability is unknown but the project chosen
by them is privately known. Section extends the two-type analysis of the previous
sections to a continuum of types. Section goes back to the two-type world but
extends the model in another dimension by assuming that CEOs privately know
their managerial abilities. Section concludes. An appendix contains further details
and proofs.
2.2 The Model
We consider a unit mass of risk-neutral CEOs, each of whom may potentially
be employed by a risk-neutral rm. CEOs di¤er in their innate managerial ability,
which is represented by i, where i = fH;Lg and L < H . A CEOwith a managerial
ability of L (H) is called a low-ability (high-ability) CEO. Each type is equally likely
in the population, and thus the average ability of a CEO is  := (H + L)=2. No
one, including the CEO herself, knows the type of a CEO, but the distribution of
types in the population is common knowledge. Thus, all parties, including the CEO
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herself, hold identical prior beliefs over managerial ability. Given her managerial
ability, she chooses her managerial action, or the project to be undertaken by
the rm. Projects di¤er in their probability of failure, r 2 [0; 1], which is privately
known by the CEO.19 There is no borrowing and lending, and neither the rm nor
the CEOs discount future payo¤s.
The rm operates for two periods, t = f1; 2g. The output of the rm in any
period is determined by both the managerial ability of and the project choice by its
current CEO.20 If a CEO of managerial ability i chooses a project with probability
of failure rt in period t, then the realized output of the rm, yt (i; rt), is
yt (i; rt) =
(
i   f (rt) with probability rt
i + f (rt) with probability 1  rt;
(1)
where f(rt) is an increasing, concave, and twice-continuously di¤erentiable manage-
rial action-return function with f(0)  0. We keep this technological specication
xed throughout the paper. The reservation payo¤ of a CEO per period is u, which
satises 0 < u  L. Thus, the rm may nd it protable to hire a CEO by paying
at least her reservation payo¤.
The expected output of the rm in period t, E[yt], is21
E [yt (i; rt)] = i + (1  2rt) f (rt) 8t = f1; 2g ; 8i = fH;Lg : (2)
Given the managerial ability, we interpret this technology as a collection of in-
vestment projects with di¤erent realized returns and probabilities of failure pairs
resulting in di¤erent expected values for each project. In a large number of papers,
the choice is between a risky and a riskless project. Our technological specication
19. In Holmstrom (1982/1999), Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), and Herma-
lin (1993), observability of project choice and risk aversion are crucial to the obtained
results. In our setting, we do not need to assume that the project choice is unob-
servable as long as CEOs do not know their abilities because the market correctly
predicts this anyway. However, this assumption will be crucial in the asymmetric
information case in which CEOs privately know their abilities and each type chooses
projects with di¤erent probabilities of failure in equilibrium.
20.This specication is consistent with the evidence showing that not only the
managerial ability (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Del Guercio
and Tkac, 2002; Falato, Li, Milbourn, 2010) but also the managerial style (in our
case the project choice) (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) matter in the rm.
21.The assumption that i enters the production technology linearly is quite com-
mon in the literature and it is assumed only for simplicity. One can generalize the
analysis by having E[yt(i; rt)] = g(i)+(1 2rt)f(rt), and this does not change the
qualitative results as long as g(i) is an increasing function.
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is a generalization of this assumption to many projects. With this specication, an
increase in the probability of failure increases the output in the good state and the
loss in the bad state. Hence, there is an optimally risky project with rt < 1 that
maximizes the expected output of the rm. Our technological specication makes
good sense in many real-life situations, especially in those involving risky nancial
investments. We now dene what we mean by an excessively risky project.
Definition 1 (Excessively risky project) An excessively risky project has a
lower expected return but higher probability of failure than the optimally risky project.
An excessively risky project is second-order stochastically dominated. However,
what we nd will be even stronger than this. We show that the expected return
from managerial action, (1   2rt)f(rt), is negative valued for the excessively risky
project chosen in the equilibrium. That is, the CEO chooses a project with so high
probability of failure that it results in negative expected return from the contribution
of managerial action to the output. Thus, she chooses a negative NPV project in
equilibrium in terms of the return from managerial action.
Contracting between the rm and the CEO is fairly simple. We assume that the
rm is not able to o¤er two-period contracts.22 Thus, in each period, the rm o¤ers
the CEO an individually rational and incentive-compatible compensation contract.
We restrict our attention to linear contracts, as our goal is to show that exces-
sively risky projects are undertaken even in the absence of compensation contracts
that increase risk appetite such as convex compensation schemes.23 The realized
compensation of the CEO in period t, wt, is given by
wt (at; bt; yt (i; rt)) = at + btyt (i; rt) 8t = f1; 2g ; 8i = fH;Lg ; (3)
where at  0 and bt 2 [0; 1] are compensation parameters. If bt = 0 and at > 0 in
equilibrium, then the contract is a xed-wage contract, and if bt > 0 and at = 0,
22.We make this assumption to be able to analyze the relationship between layo¤
risk and managerial risk taking, which requires focusing on a contract renewal period.
This is also a standard assumption in career concern models (Gibbons and Murphy,
1992; Hermalin, 1993; Dasgupta and Prat, 2006; Bushman, Dai, and Wang, 2010).
Hermalin (1993) argues that it is usually infeasible to commit fully to employ the
manager at a prespecied compensation in the future.
23. If we allow for stock options in addition to stocks, the incentives will be even
more skewed toward choosing excessively risky projects (see, e.g., Lambert, 1986; Ju,
Leland, and Senbet, 2003; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2007; Raviv and Landskroner,
2009; Dong, Wang, and Xie, 2010). Moreover, as Murphy (1999) mentions in his
well-known review of executive compensation, stock ownership is the most direct
way of aligning the preferences of CEOs and shareholders.
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then it provides stock ownership only. All other combinations involve both a xed
wage and stock ownership simultaneously.
Because the CEOs managerial ability is unobserved, the rst-period output of
the rm is a predictor of her future productivity. Hence, her layo¤ risk in the second
period is inuenced by the realized output in the rst period, which is inuenced by
her project choice. This creates the CEOs career concern in our setting and results
in a misalignment between her and the rms preferences. The CEO maximizes
her two-period expected compensation by choosing a project in each period, while
the rm engages in period-by-period maximization and makes a ring decision in
between the two periods, if necessary, upon updating its beliefs based on the rst-
period output realization.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of the rst period, the rm
signs a contract with a CEO that species her compensation in this period. Upon
employment, the CEO chooses a project, whose probability of failure is represented
by r1. Then, the rst-period output y1 is realized. The rm pays w1 to the CEO,
updates its beliefs about her managerial ability based on the realized output, and
decides whether to re her. We call a CEO who is hired again in the second period
an old CEO; and if the rm hires a new CEO in the second period, we call her a
new CEO. Depending on its ring decision, at the beginning of the second period,
the rm signs a new compensation contract with either the old or a new CEO. The
CEO chooses a project, whose probability of failure is represented r2, for the second
period. Finally, the second-period output y2 is realized, the CEO is paid w2, and
the rm is dissolved.
As a benchmark, we rst characterize the complete information setting in which
both the managerial ability and the project choice of the CEOs are observable.
Obviously, the rm wants to employ a high-ability CEO, and this CEO has no career
concern as there is no risk of being red. As a result, we can obtain the optimally
risky project with probability of failure rt from the joint surplus maximization,
maxrtfE[yt(H ; rt)]g, whose rst-order condition yields 2f(rt) = (1 2rt)f 0(rt), from
which we can easily see that the optimally risky projects probability of failure level
satises rt < 1=2 in any interior solution.
24 The CEO earns just her reservation
payo¤ in expected terms in the optimal compensation contact, which may involve
xed wage and stock ownership in various combinations.
24.The second-order condition,  4f 0(rt) + f 00(rt)(1  2rt)  0, holds for all rt <
1=2.
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2.3 Symmetric-Incomplete Information Case
In the symmetric-incomplete information setting, neither the CEO nor the rm
knows the type of the CEO, and only the CEO knows her projects probability of
failure. We proceed backwards to solve the model. The next subsection analyzes the
second period and shows that the CEO, whether new or old, chooses the optimally
risky project in the second period because she no longer has any career concern in
this period as the rm will be dissolved after that. It also shows that the rm res
a CEO at the end of the rst period if and only if, upon observing the rst-period
output, it believes that the CEOs ability is less than the average ability in the
population. The subsection following the next analyzes the rst period and shows
that choosing an excessively risky project can be an equilibrium when the di¤erence
between the abilities is neither too high nor too low.
The Second Period
This subsection derives the rms optimal ring rule and obtains the project that
a CEO chooses in the second period. Because the CEO has no career concern in the
second period, the problem that the rm faces is a standard moral hazard problem
whose solution leaves no surplus to the CEO, who eventually chooses the optimally
risky project.
The rm maximizes expected output net of expected CEO compensation sub-
ject to the individual rationality constraint, which guarantees that the CEO nds it
better to sign the compensation contract than to pursue her outside option, and the
incentive compatibility constraint, which guarantees that the rms maximization
problem is consistent with the project choice that results from the CEO maximiza-
tion problem. The incentive compatibility constraint is given by
r2 2 argmax
r^2
E [a2 + b2 ( + (1  2r^2) f (r^2))] : (4)
The CEO does not know her ability but rationally expects it to be  if she is a
new CEO. If she is an old CEO, then all terms are conditional on the rst-period
output realization. Thus, her type is expected to be ~ := E[i j y1(; r1)], which is
her expected ability given the rst-period output y1(; r1).
Because the expected compensation is a concave function of r2 for its positive
range, we can comfortably replace the incentive compatibility constraint with its
rst-order condition. Yet, this rst-order condition is exactly the same as the rst-
order condition of the complete information setting as long as the compensation
contract includes some stock ownership (i.e., b2 > 0). Hence, the CEO, whether
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new or old, chooses the optimally risky project with r2 in equilibrium.
25 The rm
adjusts the compensation parameters such that the individual rationality constraint
binds in equilibrium and the CEO gets exactly her reservation payo¤, u, in expected
terms. This analysis leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Project choice in the second period) The CEO, whether
old or new, chooses the optimally risky project with r2 in the second period.
CEOs do not have career concerns in the second period because the rm is dis-
solved at the end of this period. Hence, this proposition predicts that the preferences
of CEOs who are closer to end of their careers to be more in line with the prefer-
ences of the shareholders. The results in the literature about changes in managers
behavior as their careers evolve are somewhat mixed. Avery and Chevalier (1999)
argue that risk taking increases over time as the manager becomes more condent
in her abilities. Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000),
and Lamont (2002) provide some evidence for this. Prendergast and Stole (1996)
argue the opposite, and Graham (1999), Menkho¤, Schmidt, and Brozynski (2006),
and Boyson (2010) provide evidence in favor of this opposing view.
An obvious but important corollary of the above ndings is that if the solution
of the rms maximization problem yields lower prots with ~ than with , the rm
res the old CEO and hires a new one.26 This leads to the optimal ring rule.
Corollary 1 (Optimal firing rule) The rm res the old CEO and hires a
new one in the second period i¤ ~ < .
This ring rule is consistent with Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994, 1998), Hermalin
and Weisbach (1998, 2012), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and Bushman, Dai, and
25.When b2 = 0, the CEO is indi¤erent between any projects, including the
optimally risky one. Thus, the rm wants to o¤er some stock in equilibrium.
26.The implicit assumption here is that the reservation payo¤ of the CEO, u,
remains unchanged despite the fact that beliefs about her type are updated based
on the rst-period output. In reality, this reservation payo¤ may adjust (see the
arguments in Holmstrom, 1982/1999; and Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). Following
Bushman, Dai, and Wang (2010), we assume for simplicity that there is downward
rigidity in the reservation payo¤s because managerial ability is rm specic and
valuable only within the organization. Nonetheless, choosing an excessively risky
project in equilibrium is possible even when reservation payo¤s get updated in re-
sponse to changes in beliefs about managerial ability. In such a case, a managers
future compensation is still an increasing function of rms expectation about her
ability, and as we show in the text, she can increase markets expectation about her
ability by choosing an excessively risky project.
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Wang (2010), in all of which the CEO is red if the assessment about her ability is
below a particular threshold. There is in fact an association between CEO turnover
and their relative performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner, Watts, and
Wruck, 1988; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; Pourciau,
1993; Parrino, 1997; Defond and Park, 1999; Kaplan and Minton, 2012).
The First Period
This subsection shows the possibility that an excessively risky project is un-
dertaken in the rst period. The optimal ring rule that we derive in the previous
subsection says that the rm keeps the old CEO if and only if ~  . Thus, the CEO
has an incentive to inuence the markets belief in her ability by her project choice.
This is in her best interest if the benet of decreasing her layo¤ risk is greater than
her loss from compensation due to choosing a project di¤erent from the optimally
risky project.
We now derive the CEOs probability of being red at the end of the rst period,
p. Because there are two types (high and low) and two states (good and bad) in the
model, there are four possible state realizations for any given project choice. If the
CEO chooses the optimally risky project with r1, the rm infers her actual ability
upon observing the output, unless by chance outputs coincide for this project choice
in any two state realizations.27 Then, high-ability CEOs are red with probability
zero while low-ability ones are red with probability one. Given that each type is
equally likely in the population, the ex ante probability of being red is 1=2.
Similarly, for other project choices for which the rm infers the actual ability
of the CEO upon observing the output (i.e., the cases in which the outputs do
not overlap for any state realization of the two types), high-ability CEOs are red
with probability zero while low-ability ones are red with probability one. Then,
once again, the ex ante probability of being red is 1=2. This means that, given
any positive amount of stock ownership, optimally risky project with r1 dominates
any such project choice, because the CEO faces the same probability of being red
even when she chooses the optimally risky project but receives a higher rst-period
compensation by doing so.
So, which project does a CEO choose in equilibrium? To answer this, we need to
consider three cases in terms of the di¤erence between the abilities. The rst case is
27.Because the optimally risky projects probability of failure is less than 1=2, the
expectation about the CEOs ability will be below average when outputs coincide
for the optimally risky project by chance. Then, the probability of being red will
be higher than 1=2.
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the case in which even the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO is higher than the
good-state output of a low-ability CEO for any project choice and so outputs cannot
overlap. This occurs when H   f(1)  L + f(1) or when the di¤erence between
the abilities is high (i.e., H   L  2f(1)). This is because if this inequality holds,
then it should strictly hold for all r1 2 [0; 1) as f() is an increasing function. In
this case, the rm is able to infer the actual ability of a CEO for all possible output
realizations, and thus the probability of being red is independent of CEOs project
choice and equal to 1=2. Then, again, given any positive amount of stock ownership,
the optimally risky project with r1 dominates all other projects as it involves the
same layo¤ risk with higher rst-period compensation. The following lemma records
this result.
Lemma 3 (Case 1) When the di¤erence between the abilities is high (i.e., H L 
2f(1)), the CEO chooses the optimally risky project with r1 < 1=2, in equilibrium.
Her probability of being red is 1=2.
In the second case, the di¤erence between the abilities is intermediate (i.e.,
2f(1=2)  H   L < 2f(1)). Now, by choosing the project with r1 = f 1((H  
L)=2), the CEO is able to overlap the bad-state output when she turns out to be a
high-ability CEO with the good-state output when she turns out to be a low-ability
CEO (i.e., H   f(r1) = L + f(r1)). If the rm observes this overlappedoutput
level, it is not certain about which type could have produced this output. Then, the
conditional expectation on the type of the CEO is
E [i j y1] = (1  r1) L + r1H : (5)
As a natural consequence of statistical inference, this conditional expectation in-
creases as the projects probability of failure increases. Because 1=2  f 1((H  
L)=2), we know that r1  1=2; this in turn implies E[i j y1]  . Therefore, the rm
keeps the CEO in the rm when it observes this overlapped output. Outputs do not
coincide in the remaining state realizations, the CEOs type is perfectly inferred, and
as a result the high-ability ones are retained while the low-ability ones are red. Con-
sequently, the probability of being red is p = Pr f = LgPr fy1 = L   f (r1)g =
r1=2, which is denitely less than 1=2, the probability of being red when the CEO
chooses a di¤erent project, and so her type is inferred in all state realizations.
Choosing r1 minimizes the probability of being red but it is not automatically
an equilibrium. By choosing the excessively risky project rather than the optimally
risky project, the CEO is minimizing her layo¤ risk in the second period, but, she
is now o¤ered lower compensation in the rst period because she did not choose the
optimally risky project. For now, we report the project with r1 as the project that
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minimizes the layo¤ risk, but later we derive the conditions under which choosing
that project becomes an equilibrium.
Lemma 4 (Case 2) When the di¤erence between the abilities is intermediate (i.e.,
2f(1=2)  H   L < 2f(1)), the probability of failure that minimizes the probability
of being red is equal to
r1 = f
 1

H   L
2

 1
2
; (6)
which is associated with an excessively risky project. The CEOs resulting probability
of being red is r1=2.
Finally, in the third case, the di¤erence between the abilities is low (i.e., 0 <
H   L < 2f(1=2)). Let us rst consider the interval 2f(0) < H   L < 2f(1=2).
Following the reasoning we have in Case 2, we obtain (5) once again when the CEO
chooses to overlap the outputs. However, this time E[i j y1] <  in such a case.
She keeps her job only when she turns out to be a high-ability CEO who lands in
the good state. Thus, when she overlaps the outputs, her probability of being red
is p = 1   Pr f = Hg  Pr fy1 = H + f (r1)g = (1 + r1)=2, which is higher than
1=2, the probability of being red when she chooses a di¤erent project, and so the
outputs do not overlap for any two state realizations. This suggests that in this case,
given any positive amount of stock ownership, the optimally risky project with r1
dominates all other projects, including the one with r1.28 In the remaining part of
the interval of case 3 (i.e., 0 < H   L  2f(0)) outputs do not match in any way
and thus the probability of being red cannot be any lower than 1=2, which implies
that the CEO chooses the optimally risky project.
Lemma 5 (Case 3) When the di¤erence between the abilities is low (i.e.,0 < H  
L < 2f(1=2), the CEO chooses the optimally risky project with r1 < 1=2, in equi-
librium. Her probability of being red is 1=2.
In sum, the CEO chooses the optimally risky project in equilibrium when the
di¤erence between the abilities is high or low, but when the di¤erence between the
two abilities is intermediate she may choose a project at which the bad-state output
of a high-ability CEO coincides with the good-state output of a low-ability CEO.
This strategy minimizes her layo¤ risk. Of course, for this to be an equilibrium, it
must also be in her best interest to do so, which we focus on next.
28. If outputs match by chance for the optimally risky project, then the CEO
chooses a project whose probability of failure is arbitrarily close to the one for the
optimally risky project.
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In the rest of this subsection, we analyze possible equilibrium project choices
when the di¤erence between the abilities is intermediate. According to Lemma 4, if
the CEO chooses the excessively risky project with r1, then her probability of being
red is r1=2. If she chooses any other project, her probability of being red is 1=2.
Then, she is better o¤ choosing the optimally risky project with r1 among all these
possible projects because her probability of being red is still 1=2 but her rst-period
compensation is higher. This means that the optimally risky project with r1 always
dominates all other projects, except the excessively risky project with r1, given any
positive amount of stock ownership. Thus, the CEOs choice in Case 2 is between
the projects with r1 and r1 only.
The rms maximization problem is the same as in the second period, except
now it includes an additional constraint. If the rm wants the CEO to choose the
optimally risky project, it must compensate the forgone expected payo¤ that comes
from increased layo¤risk by not choosing the project with r1. We call this constraint
the career concern constraint, which is given by
E

w1
 
a1; b1; y1
 
; r1

+
u
2
 E w1  a1; b1; y1  ; r1+ (2  r1)u
2
if r1 6= r1:
(CC)
The left-hand side of this constraint is the expected payo¤ of the CEO if she chooses
the optimally risky project with r1 and the right-hand side is that if she chooses
the excessively risky project with r1. This constraint is derived as follows. If the
CEO chooses the excessively risky project with r1, her probability of keeping her
job in the second period, in which she always obtains her reservation payo¤ u, is
(2 r1)=2. Therefore, her second-period expected payo¤ is [(2 r1)u]=2 if she chooses
the excessively risky project with r1 in the rst period. Adding her expected rst-
period compensation to this term yields the right-hand side of the inequality. If she
chooses the optimally risky project with r1, the probability of keeping her job in the
second period is 1=2; hence, her expected payo¤ is u=2 in the second period. Adding
her expected rst-period compensation to this term yields the left-hand side of the
inequality.
Reorganizing the career concern constraint after employing the linear compen-
sation contract assumption gives
(1  2r1) f (r1)  (1  2r1) f (r1) 
(1  r1)u
2b1
: (CC)
This constraint shows that when the career concern is su¢ ciently strong, it may be
stricter than the incentive compatibility constraint; thus, the solution may involve
the excessively risky project with r1 chosen by the CEO as a result of the discon-
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tinuous jump created by her career concern. The next question is exactly when
choosing the excessively risky project with r1 is better than choosing the optimally
risky project with r1, which we proceed to answer now. A necessary condition is
that the rm prefers operating when the CEO chooses the excessively risky project
with r1, which holds as long as u  L, which we have already assumed.
There are two cases to consider in which excessively risky projects are undertaken
in equilibrium. In the rst, satisfying the career concern constraint and having the
CEO choose the optimally risky project requires giving her stocks more valuable
than the rms output (i.e., b1 > 1), which the rm cannot a¤ord without incurring
a loss. Thus, in such a situation, the rm involuntarily allows the excessively risky
project to be undertaken in equilibrium. If, therefore,
(1  2r1) f (r1)  (1  2r1) f (r1) <
(1  r1)u
2
; (9)
then (CC) is satised only when b1 > 1, which the rm cannot a¤ord without
incurring a loss, and thus we get the excessively risky project undertaken in equilib-
rium. This inequality represents a situation in which the CEOs career benet from
choosing the excessively risky project to hide her type is higher than the expected
return from the project. In such a case, the rm cannot compensate the CEO for
her career benet from choosing the excessively risky project, even if it o¤ers the
whole rst-period return to her. Note that all terms in this inequality are exogenous.
Thus, if it holds, then (CC) cannot hold, and the excessively risky project becomes
imperative.
In the second case in which there is an excessively risky project undertaken
in equilibrium, having the CEO choose optimally risky project is less protable
than letting her choose excessively risky one. Thus, the rm voluntarily allows
the excessively risky project to be undertaken in equilibrium.29 This time, (CC)
is satised, which requires providing an amount of stock ownership that satises
b1  (u(1   r1))=(2[(1   2r1)f(r1)   (1   2r1)f(r1)]). Hence, the lowest possible
stock compensation, b1y1(; r1), is given by the following amount:

 :=
u (1  r1)

 + (1  2r1) f (r1)

2 [(1  2r1) f (r1)  (1  2r1) f (r1)]
: (10)
29. In a related vein, Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) also mentions that even af-
ter eliminating the excessive risk from the perspective of the common shareholders
in banks, there may still remain excessive risk from the perspective of the soci-
ety because common shareholders are not concerned about preferred shareholders,
bondholders, depositors, and tax payers. We get our result for a di¤erent reason
because we do not have any of these third parties in the model.
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Then, if (1   2r1)f(r1)   
 < (1   2r1)f(r1)   u, the rm voluntarily allows the
CEO to choose the excessively risky project. The left-hand side of this inequality
is the prot of the rm when the CEO chooses the optimally risky project and the
right-hand side is that when she chooses the excessively risky one. Reorganizing it
yields a condition that looks similar to (9):
(1  2r1) f (r1)  (1  2r1) f (r1) < 
  u: (11)
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Excessively risky project / two-type) Suppose that the dif-
ference between the abilities is intermediate (i.e., 2f(1=2)  H   L < 2f(1)). The
rm involuntarily allows the CEO to choose the excessively risky project if (9) holds.
It voluntarily allows the CEO to choose the excessively risky project if (11) holds.
The crucial point here is that choosing the excessively risky project is possible
even under an optimal compensation contract. If the excessively risky project is
undertaken, the optimal contract is given by b1 > 0, and a1 = u b1[+f(r1)(1 2r1)].
In the involuntary case, as shown in (9), it is optimal for the CEO to choose the
excessively risky project if the expected loss in output that arises from choosing
the excessively risky project is less than the career benet obtained from choosing
it. In the voluntary case, as shown in (11), the benet of choosing the optimally
risky project is less than the cost of compensating the CEO to let her choose the
optimally risky project.
Figure II
Choosing an excessively or optimally risky project in equilibrium
Figure II provides a graphical intuition for choosing the excessively risky project.
It shows the expected payo¤ of the CEO from managerial action for any r1 level.
Her payo¤ is increasing up to the optimal probability of failure r1 at point O, and
then it is ever decreasing unless her career concern kicks in, which is where her
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payo¤ discontinuously jumps up to point E. If this point is above point O, as in
Panel A, then the CEO nds it optimal to choose the excessively risky project. This
is because the decrease in her rst-period compensation due to not choosing the
optimally risky project is less than the career benet she obtains by minimizing
her layo¤ risk by choosing the excessively risky project. However, if it turns out
that point E is below point O, as in Panel B, the CEO chooses the optimally risky
project. It is noteworthy that the excessively risky project with r1 means choosing
a negative NPV project in terms of the return from managerial action. Thus, the
project choice alone contributes negatively to the rm output in equilibrium, but
the return from managerial ability absorbs the loss.30
We close this section with some comments on the structure of the model and
robustness of the results under di¤erent specications.
The fact that there is just one point jumping up discontinuously as a result of
career concern in Figure II is an artifact of our two-type specication. Nevertheless,
as we show in Section , the same mechanism works when we have a continuum of
types, in which case there is a mass of points jumping up and their local maximizer
gives us the new r1. If it is also the global maximizer (as in Panel A of Figure II),
then the excessively risky project is chosen in equilibrium. Otherwise, the CEO
chooses the optimally risky project (as in Panel B of Figure II).
Our main results are independent of bilateral risk neutrality. First, unlike the
bilateral risk-neutrality case of a standard hidden action problem, the career concern
can be so strong that even providing the output of the rst period to the CEO may
not prevent her from choosing the excessively risky project. The analogy would
be a young fund manager who may choose excessively risky investments even in
managing her own portfolio as a result of her concern that if she does not perform
well now, she might not receive outside funds in the future. Second, as shown in
the appendix, the results remain qualitatively the same even when the CEO is risk
averse.
The CEOs possibility of a¤ecting a ring decision with her project choice implies
behavior consistent with behavioral nances concept of CEO overcondence. This
literature is based on the hypothesis that many CEOs tend to think that they are
better than the average (Malmendier and Tate 2005), and this leads them to be
more likely to attribute good outcomes to their managerial ability or style. Hence,
30.Palomino and Prat (2003) provide a similar gure representing the set of risky
portfolios. They mention that the textbook analysis shows only the increasing part
of the gure as the decreasing part involves dominated strategies. However, those
strategies are in fact chosen in their analysis as well as ours.
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the literature argues that overcondent managers overestimate their abilities, so
their investment decisions are riskier than is ideal. In our setting, a rationalCEO
chooses an excessively risky project not because she is overestimating her ability,
but to ensure that the market overestimates her ability.
In this simple two-type world, a bonus contract, which pays a xed sum if the
output is above a certain threshold, may in fact implement the optimally risky
project. Suppose, for example, the rm promises to pay a xed bonus equal to
u if the CEO obtains H + f(r1), H   f(r1), L + f(r1), or L   f(r1) and zero
otherwise. The CEO is still red if her assessed ability is below average. While it is
immediately clear that this contract implements the optimally risky project if the
CEO cannot sabotage output, proving the same result when sabotaging output is
possible requires some treatment.
When sabotaging output is possible, the CEO chooses the excessively risky
project withr1, which satises L+f(r1) = H f(r1). The probability of failurer1
is higher than r1 dened in (6). If the CEO obtains H+f(r1), she can sabotage out-
put (perhaps by selling it with too low a price) and make it appear as if she chose the
optimally risky project with r1. In this case, she not only gets the bonus in the rst
period but also keeps her job in the second period. If she obtains H f(r1), then she
cannot get the bonus, but she keeps her job in the second period because the rm in-
fers that she is a high-ability CEO. If she obtains L+f(r1), the rm cannot be sure
if she is a low-ability CEO in the good state or a high-ability CEO in the bad state.
However, because r1 > r1, it expects her type to be higher than  and thus keeps
her in the rm in the second period. Moreover, because L + f(r1) = H   f(r1), it
pays the bonus. Finally, if she obtains L  f(r1), she cannot get the bonus and she
is red for sure. Consequently, her expected two-period benet from choosing the
excessively risky project withr1 is (1 r1)u+(2 r1)u=2, while that from choosing
the optimally risky project is u+ u=2, which is higher. Thus, whether the CEO can
sabotage output or not, the bonus contract implements the optimally risky project.
One can put forward this result as a remarkable argument supporting bonus
contracts against excessive risk taking. After all, the common view in the media is
that it is in fact these contracts that triggers excessive risk taking but this result says
that they can in fact prevent it.31 Though, one needs to be careful in coming to this
conclusion from our model. The economic environment in the model is so simple that
the rm learns quite a lot about the project choice simply by looking at the output.
This disappears in a relatively more complex environment with idiosyncrasies while
31.This view has an impact in recent regulatory framework, too. For example, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act prohibits TARP recipients from paying
or accruing any bonus, but allows restricted stocks.
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the mechanism we talk about (namely the motivation for choosing projects in order
to minimize layo¤ risk) is still at work.
2.4 Continuum of Types Case
In this section, we extend the line of reasoning we derived from the two-type
analysis to a continuum of CEO types. Our analysis also predicts an inverse U-
shaped relationship between unobservable ability and the probability of being red:
while the above-average CEOs do not face any layo¤ risk, among the below-average
CEOs, higher-ability ones are certainly red while lower-ability ones are red only
with some probability.
The optimal ring rule, derived in Corollary 1, and the optimal second-period
compensation contract, which gives the CEO her reservation payo¤ in the second
period, continue to apply in this section. Thus, as in the two-type case, the basic
mechanism of the model works as follows. Given that the CEO is paid her reservation
payo¤ in the second period, she trades o¤ the decrease in her layo¤ risk in the second
period by choosing an excessively risky project in the rst period for the increase
in her expected compensation in the rst period by choosing the optimally risky
project. There are robust instances in which the former e¤ect dominates the latter
in expected payo¤, and thus we get an excessively risky project chosen in equilibrium,
either by the rms consent or against its will.
We shall now talk about the range of abilities rather than the di¤erence
between the two abilities,as there is now a continuum of abilities rather than just
two. In particular, we assume that managerial abilities are uniformly distributed on
the interval [L; H ] with mean . Just as in the two-type world, it turns out that
there are three possible cases to consider in terms of the range of abilities (high,
intermediate, and low), and we nd that excessively risky projects undertaken in
equilibrium only for the intermediate range of abilities. For brevity, we state only the
results for the other two cases in the following lemma, leaving the detailed analysis
to the appendix.
Lemma 6 (Cases 1 and 3) When there is a high (i.e., H   L  4f(1)) or low
(i.e., H   L < 2f(1=2)) range of abilities in the CEO labor market, the CEO
chooses the optimally risky project with r1 < 1=2, in equilibrium. Her probability of
being red is 1=2.
Now, consider Case 2 in which there is an intermediate range of abilities in the
CEO labor market (i.e., 2f(1=2)  H   L < 4f(1)). This time, we proceed by the
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guess-and-verify method. We make the educated guess that the CEO chooses the
project with r1 such that
4r1f (r1) = H   L (12)
is satised. This is the project choice that guarantees that even the worst type is
able to overlap her good-state output with the bad-state output of an above-average
CEO. The subsequent analysis proceeds as follows. Assuming the project with r1
to be the equilibrium project choice, we rst derive the probability of being red.
Then, in the appendix , we prove that this project is indeed the one that minimizes
the probability of being red. Finally, we show that minimizing the probability of
being red can indeed be an equilibrium under certain conditions.
Figure III
The partition of CEO types in case 2
Figure III shows the partition of CEOs on the ability distribution. The partitions
are denoted by A, B, C, and D. The ability range of this case guarantees that, given
r1, there is a 00-type whose bad-state output coincides with the good-state output
of the worst type, L, and the rms expectation between these two types is exactly
 (that is, L + f(r1) = 00   f(r1) and (1  r1)L + r100 = ). They also guarantee
that there is a 0-type whose good-state output coincides with the bad-state output
of the best type, H (that is, 0 + f(r1) = H   f(r1)). Of course, the expectation
between these two types must be higher than .
Figure III provides the distance between the particular types mentioned in the
previous paragraph. Eq. (12) implies that the distance between L and  and the
distance between  and H are both 2r1f(r1) because  is the mean of the uniform
distribution. Moreover, from the specications provided in the previous paragraph,
one can easily nd that the distance between  and 00 is 2(1  r1)f(r1). Thus, the
distance between 00 and H is 2(2r1 1)f(r1), which is also the distance between L
and 0. Consequently, the mass in A is equal to the mass in D and the mass in B
is equal to the mass in C. Note also that r1 is associated with an excessively risky
project because it is higher than 1=2 as a result of the fact that 4r1f(r1) > 2f(1=2)
in this case.
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We can now derive the probability of being red in each partition. Because the
expectation between L and 00 is exactly  at r1, the expectation about the ability
of a CEO in A must be higher than  when she obtains the good-state output. Thus,
she is rehired in such an output realization. If she obtains the bad-state output, her
ability is inferred and she is red for certain. Thus, the probability of being red for
a CEO in this partition is r1. Next, consider a CEO in B. With the given project
choice, she is not able to overlap her good-state output with the bad-state output
of any existent type and yet her ability is less than ; thus, she is certainly red in
any output realization.
Now consider a CEO in C. Her ability is inferred to be above  because there
is no CEO below  overlapping her good-state output with the bad-state output of
this CEO. Thus, she is rehired for certain. Finally, the bad-state output of a CEO
in D coincides with the good-state output of a CEO in A, and thus she is rehired in
her bad state. She is rehired for certain in her good state as well, because her output
in that state does not coincide with the bad-state output of any existent type above
her. Hence, the probability of being red is zero for a CEO in this partition.
Given the above analysis, the overall probability of being red is given by p =
r1  Prf 2 Ag+ 1 Prf 2 Bg+ 0 Prf 2 Cg+ 0 Prf 2 Dg, or
p = r1
2 (2r1   1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
+
2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
=
2r21   2r1 + 1
2r1
; (13)
which is denitely less than 1=2 because r1 > 1=2. What remains to be shown is
that the project with r1 is indeed the one that minimizes the probability of being
red, which we prove in the appendix by comparing the p value in (13) with the ones
that stem from other possible project choices. Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7 (Case 2) When there is an intermediate range of abilities in the CEO
labor market (i.e., 2f(1=2)  H   L < 4f(1)), the probability of failure level
that minimizes the probability of being red solves (12), which is associated with an
excessively risky project. The resulting probability of being red is given by (13).
In the rest of this section, we look for the equilibrium project choice in Case
2. As in the two-type case, the probability of failure of a project that solves (12)
is not automatically an equilibrium. For that to be an equilibrium, minimizing
the probability of being red must be in the best interest of the CEO. This may
be the case when the CEOs compensation benet by choosing the optimally risky
project is dominated in expected payo¤by the career benet she derives by choosing
the excessively risky project and hence minimizing her probability of being red.
However, unlike the two-type case in which choosing the excessively risky project
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with r1 is the only serious alternative against the optimally risky project, here
the CEO may potentially choose a project di¤erent from the one minimizing the
probability of being red in equilibrium.
As shown in the appendix, choosing a project with a probability of failure higher
than r1, satisfying f(r1) 2 (f(r1); 2r1f(r1)), results in a higher probability of being
red than choosing the project with r1. At the same time, because r1 is closer to
r1, the rst-period compensation is going to be higher with any amount of stock-
based compensation. Thus, choosing the project with r1 still dominates in expected
payo¤ choosing any project satisfying f(r1) 2 (f(r1); 2r1f(r1)). However, if the
CEO chooses a project satisfying f(r1) 2 (r1f(r1); f(r1)), as shown in the appendix,
the probability of being red is still higher than choosing the project with r1, yet
this time the rst-period compensation is going to be higher with any amount of
stock-based compensation because this projects probability of failure is closer to r1.
As a result, the CEO may prefer to trade o¤ the increased probability of being red
for higher rst-period compensation. Any such project chosen in equilibrium is still
excessively risky although it does not minimize the layo¤ risk. Therefore, unlike the
two-type case, there are now many excessively risky projects in an interval that may
be chosen in equilibrium rather than just one such project (i.e., point E of Figure
II). The local maximizer of this interval is the most serious candidate against the
optimally risky project, and in fact, if it is also the global maximizer it is the
equilibrium.
We now turn to the derivation of the optimal contract. The increase in the
probability of being rehired in the second period by choosing the project with r1 in
the rst period is now given by
(1  p (r1))  (1  p (r1)) =
3r1   2r21   1
2r1
: (14)
Thus, the new career concern constraint with r1 is given by
E

a1 + b1y1
 
; r1
  E a1 + b1y1  ; r1 
(3r1   2r21   1)u
2r1
if f(r1) =2 (r1f(r1); f(r1)); (CC)
where the left-hand side is the extra compensation that the rm must provide to
the CEO for her expected forgone career benet by choosing a project with r1 such
that f(r1) =2 (r1f(r1); f(r1)), which is shown on the right-hand side. Apart from
this change in the career concern constraint, the maximization problem of the rm
and its solution remain qualitatively the same. Thus, we provide the following
proposition without a proof.
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Proposition 6 (Excessively risky project / continuum) Suppose there is
an intermediate range of abilities in the CEO labor market (i.e., 2f(1=2)  H L <
4f(1)). The rm involuntarily allows the CEO to choose the excessively risky project
if
f (r1) (1  2r1)  f (r1) (1  2r1) <
(3r1   2r21   1)u
2r1
: (15)
It voluntarily allows the CEO to choose the excessively risky project if
f (r1) (1  2r1) f (r1) (1  2r1) <
(3r1   2r21   1)

f (r1) (1  2r1) + 

u
2r1 [f (r1) (1  2r1)  f (r1) (1  2r1)]
 u: (16)
In both cases, the equilibrium project choice with r1 satises f(r1) 2 (r1f(r1); f(r1)],
where r1 is dened by (12).
Eqs. (15) and (16) are respectively the counterparts of (9) and (11) in the
continuum of types case. Note that if these equations hold for the project with
probability of failure with r1 and if another project whose probability of failure sat-
isfying f(r1) 2 (r1f(r1); f(r1)] dominates the project with r1, then these conditions
hold for that project as well. Thus, the proposition applies for any project in that
interval, not just for the one with r1. The intuitions for (15) and (16) are the same
as those provided for Proposition 5. Eq. (15) says that the career benet the CEO
derives from choosing the excessively risky project is higher than the compensation
benet she derives in the rst period by choosing the optimally risky project, even
when she is o¤ered the whole rst-period return. Thus, the rm cannot design a
linear compensation contract that implements the optimally risky project, even if it
wants to do so. Eq. (16) gives the condition under which the expected prot of the
rm is higher with the excessively risky project than that with the optimally risky
one. As in the two-type case, one can easily see that none of our results stems from
our assumption that the CEO is risk neutral.
So far, we have shown that all results of the two-type case extend to the contin-
uum of types case. This case also provides an important prediction that we do not
have in the two-type case. Consider a CEO whose ability is below  in Figure III.
If she is in A, then she is able to overlap her good-state output with the bad-state
output of an above-average CEO; thus she is not red in such a state. However, if
she is in B, then she is not able to overlap her good-state output with the bad-state
output of any existent type in the ability distribution. As a result, a CEO in B
is red for certain whereas one in A is red only with probability r1, which means
that, among those who are below average, a worse type is less likely to be red than
a better type. However, those who are in C and D, all of whom are above average,
are not red in any case. Thus, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between
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unobserved ability and the probability of being red.
Proposition 7 (Ability and layoff risk) There is an inverse U-shaped rela-
tionship between the unobserved ability and the probability of being red.
The intuition for this result is as follows. By choosing a riskier project, a lower-
ability CEO can disguise her type more convincingly because her good-state output
is not going to be very high anyway. Hence, she has some chance of successfully
substituting the return from managerial ability with the return from managerial
action. The rm is skeptical to some extent, but it is not 100% sure if the CEO is
below average ability or not. A higher-ability (but still below average) CEO is also
able to do the same substitution, but this time the observed output is so high that
the rm believes that there is no way that this CEO is above average ability. That
is, if the CEO ends up with an unbelievably high output, then the rm is certain
that this output is coming from a lucky below-average type who gambled and thus
res her without hesitation.
2.5 Asymmetric Information Case
This section relaxes our informational assumption by assuming that CEOs pri-
vately know their abilities in the two-type setting. Now that CEOs know their
abilities, di¤erent types can choose di¤erent projects in equilibrium. The reserva-
tion payo¤ of a high-ability CEO is now uH , which satises uH  H , and that
of a low-ability CEO is uL, which satises uL  L. It is natural to assume that
uH > uL, considering that high-ability CEOs have higher outside options. We also
make the following assumption, which rules out the possibility of separation in the
second period.
Assumption 1 (No separation) H L  3(uH (uL=2)) and L=H  uL=uH .
The two expressions in this assumption ensure that the rm cannot o¤er a con-
tract aimed only at the low- and high-ability CEOs, respectively.32 Hence, knowing
that CEOs have no career concerns in the second period, the rm o¤ers a pooling
32.Unlike many asymmetric information problems, here the rm may want to
attract only the low-ability CEOs because it may eliminate the moral hazard aspect
of the problem. That is, the benet of hiring a low-ability CEO (who is going to
choose the optimally risky project) with a separating contract may outweigh the
benet of hiring a CEO (who will not choose the optimally risky project if she is a
low-ability one) with a pooling contract.
48
compensation contract that attracts both types. In turn, both CEO types choose
the optimally risky project in the equilibrium, and thus no agency problem arises
in this period, as in the previous sections. Because a pooling contract is o¤ered
in the second period, the optimal ring rule derived in the symmetric-incomplete
information model continues to hold in this information setting.
To show the possibility of an excessively risky project undertaken in equilibrium,
we now turn to the analysis of the rst period. Allowing for asymmetric information
extensively enlarges the strategy space of the CEOs. In the two-type world, a CEO
may choose to overlap the good-state output of a low-ability CEO with the bad-
state output of a high-ability one. Now that she knows her own ability, she can even
overlap good states with good states and bad states with bad states. We rst show
that the rms expectation about the CEOs ability is higher than  in each of these
cases. Thus, it is not ex ante clear which one is the best strategy for the CEO under
various conditions.
Lemma 8 (Strategies) Suppose that high-ability CEOs choose the optimally risky
project with r1. Consider a low-ability CEO.
1. If she chooses the project with r1 2 [1  r1; 1), at which her good-state output
overlaps with the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO (i.e., L+f(r1) = y1 =
H   f(r1)), then, upon observing such an output level, the rms expectation
about her ability is greater than or equal to . Her overall probability of being
red is r1.
2. If she chooses the project with r01, at which her good-state output overlaps with
the good-state output of a high-ability CEO, (i.e., L+f(r01) = y
0
1 = H+f(r

1)),
then, upon observing such an output level, the rms expectation about her
ability is greater than or equal to . Her overall probability of being red is r01.
3. If she chooses the project with r^1, at which her bad-state output overlaps with
the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO (i.e., L f(r^1) = y^1 = H f(r1)),
then, upon observing such an output level, the rms expectation about her
ability is greater than or equal to . Her overall probability of being red is
1  r^1.
The proof is in the appendix. It is obvious that a high-ability CEO is rehired for
certain in the second period in any of the three cases of this lemma. Thus, she will
in fact choose the optimally risky project with r1 because this maximizes her rst-
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period compensation without a¤ecting her probability of being red.33 However, a
low-ability CEOs choice is among projects with r1, r01, r^1, and r

1, depending on the
case.
The strategies dened in Lemma 8 are not always viable. First, none is viable
when H   f(r1)  L + f(1), because in such a case, a low-ability CEO cannot
overlap her output with the output of a high-ability CEO in any state. Second, as
the rst part of Lemma 8 suggests, the project with r1 is not an e¤ective strategy for
a low-ability CEO when r1 2 [0; 1 r1), because it does not decrease her probability
of being red. Third, choosing a project with r01 is a viable strategy only if H +
f(r1) < L + f(1); otherwise, there exists no project with r
0
1 overlapping the good-
state output of a low-ability CEO with that of a high-ability CEO. This requires
H   L 2 (0; f(1)  f(r1)). Fourth, choosing a project with r^1 is a viable strategy
only if L f(0) > H f(r1); otherwise, there exists no project with r^1 overlapping
the bad-state output of a low-ability CEO with that of a high-ability CEO. This
requires H   L 2 (0; f(r1)  f(0)).
The requirements in the above paragraph result in six di¤erent cases in terms
of the di¤erence between the abilities. For brevity, we consider only Case 2 here,
in which an excessively risky project is undertaken in equilibrium, and leave the
analysis of the remaining cases to the appendix. Case 2 is of particular interest
because the CEO employs the same strategy of the previous sections in this case,
namely overlapping the good-state output of a low-ability CEO with the bad-state
output of a high-ability CEO by choosing the project with r1. However, choosing
excessively risky projects is not limited to this case. In fact, there is another case
(Case 4) in which low-ability CEOs may potentially overlap their good-state outputs
with those of high-ability CEOs by choosing the excessively risky project with r01.
34
In Case 2, H L 2 [f(r1)+f(1 r1); f(r1)+f(1)) and thus neither the project
with r01 nor the one with r^1 is viable. Assume, for the moment, that a high-ability
CEO chooses the optimally risky project with r1. We know from the rst part of
Lemma 8 that the rm rehires the low-ability CEO if she chooses the project with r1
and overlaps her good-state output with the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO.
Hence, the only serious candidate against choosing the project with r1 is choosing
33.There is an exceptional measure-zero case in which the good-state output of
low-ability CEOs coincides with the bad-state output of high-ability CEOs by chance
for the optimally risky project (i.e., L + f(r1) = H   f(r1)). In this case, as we
show in Appendix (Case 6), a high-ability CEO chooses a project whose probability
of failure is arbitrarily close (but not equal) to r1.
34. In Case 4, low-ability CEOs may even overlap their bad-state outputs with
that of high-ability CEOs by choosing the project with r^1.
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the one with r1 in this case. Now, consider a high-ability CEO. The rm keeps
her if it observes the overlapped output. It keeps her even when she produces a
di¤erent output, because her ability, which is high, is inferred. Thus, if she chooses
the optimally risky project, her probability of being red is zero regardless of her
output, which means that she has no incentive to deviate from this project, as it will
also maximize her rst-period compensation. The rm needs to pay some positive
amount of stock ownership to guarantee this, which it certainly does. This discussion
results in the following lemma.
Lemma 9 (Case 2) If H   L 2 [f(r1)+ f(1  r1); f(r1)+ f(1)), then high-ability
CEOs choose the optimally risky project with r1 in equilibrium and their probability
of being red is zero. Low-ability CEOs choose either the optimally risky project
with r1, in which case their probability of being red is one, or the excessively risky
project with r1 so that their good-state output coincides with the bad-state output of
a high-ability CEO, in which case their probability of being red is r1.
We now show the possibility that an excessively risky project is undertaken in
equilibrium. The rm hires just one CEO and therefore its contract o¤er must pro-
vide at least uH if it wants to contract with a high-ability CEO. The rst expression
in Assumption 1 (i.e., H L  3(uH  (uL=2))) ensures that attracting both types
is better for the rm than attracting only the low-ability CEOs. The second expres-
sion in Assumption 1 (i.e., L=H  uL=uH) ensures that if both types choose the
optimally risky project, then any contract that satises the individual rationality
constraint of a high-ability CEO also satises that of a low-ability CEO. If a low-
ability CEO chooses the excessively risky project with r1, she does so because it
makes her better o¤ for all compensation schemes than choosing r1. Consequently,
if high-ability CEOs participate, low-ability CEOs will participate as well.
The career concern constraint of a low-ability CEO guarantees that the extra
compensation that she gets by choosing the optimally risky project rather than that
with r1 is higher than her career benet by choosing the project with r1:
[a1 + b1L + b1 (1  2rL) f (rL)]  [a1 + b1L + b1 (1  2r1) f (r1)] 
(1  r1) [L + (1  2r

2) f (r

2)]uH
H + (1  2r2) f (r2)
if rL 6= r1: (CC)
Here, 1   r1 that appears on the right-hand side is the probability that the CEO
keeps her job and the remaining term is her expected compensation in the second
period. Then, if
(1  2r1) f (r1)  (1  2r1) f (r1) < (1  r1)
[L + (1  2r2) f (r2)]uH
H + (1  2r2) f (r2)
(17)
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is satised, the compensation contract cannot satisfy (CC) for all a1 2 <+ and
b 2 [0; 1], in which case a low-ability CEO chooses the project with r1 rather than
the one with r1. Because a high-ability CEO chooses the project with r

1 and a
low-ability one chooses the one with r1, the expected output of the rm is the
same for all b1 2 (0; 1], and hence the optimal compensation contract is the one
that minimizes the compensation without violating the constraints. The following
proposition summarizes our ndings.
Proposition 8 (Excessively risky project / asymmetric information)
If H   L 2 [f(r1) + f(1   r1); f(r1) + f(1)) and (17) holds, then, in the pooling
equilibrium, low-ability CEOs choose the excessively risky project with r1 while high-
ability CEOs choose the optimally risky project with r1.
2.6 Conclusion
The project choice of a CEO who is concerned with her career may di¤er from
the project choice that maximizes the shareholdersreturn or societys social return.
The question is in what way the project choice will be distorted. The managerial
conservatism literature suggests that a top manager is likely to be less entrepre-
neurial and take too little risk because she would like to oversee the rm with the
least amount of problems and the minimum risk of obtaining bad states; thus this
literature advises shareholders to design compensation contracts that encourage the
manager to take higher risk.
In this paper, we show that CEOs layo¤risk may lead them to employ excessively
risky projects. The existence of limited liability or convex compensations schemes
are the two common explanations for excessive risk taking. Thus, to highlight the
new channel we o¤er in this paper, we allow for only linear combinations of xed-
wage and stock compensation and do not assume limited liability. We show that
optimal linear compensation contracts may not be helpful in preventing CEOs from
choosing excessively risky projects. Because a CEO is replaced by a new CEO if
her expected ability is below average, in trying to limit her layo¤ risk, she chooses a
project that can improve the markets belief about her ability. In our setting, this can
be achieved with choosing an excessively risky project when the range of managerial
abilities is neither too high nor too low. The CEO chooses the project with which
the good-state output when she turns out to be a low-ability type coincides with
the bad-state output when she turns out to be a high-ability type.
While the rm foresees that the CEO will choose an excessively risky project,
once it observes the overlapped output level, it has to statistically infer that this is
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more likely to be the output of a high-ability CEO who is in the bad state than the
output of a low-ability CEO who is in the good state, as the bad state is more likely
with an excessively risky project. Although the rm is not fooled by the actions of
the CEO, its expectation about the CEOs ability is that it is above average, despite
the fact that each type is equally likely in the population.
Whether there is excessive or too little risk in the market is obviously a sector-
specic question. A president of a university may opt for a quiet life while a surgeon
may push for surgery even though it is not entirely necessary. We believe that the
banking industry, or the nancial sector in general, is an example of excessive risk
taking. The structure of nancial markets are so complicated that shareholders
cannot entirely and precisely evaluate whether the observed return is due to the
CEOs ability or to pure luck. Using nancial derivatives, CEOs can simply gamble
on anything and possibly improve the markets belief on their ability. For one reason
or another, there is a mismatch between the preferences of shareholders and CEOs,
and we believe that there always will be.
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2.7 Appendix: Proofs
Risk-averse CEO
This appendix shows that the possibility of excessively risky project undertaken
by the rm is not coming from the assumption of bilateral risk neutrality. Assume,
for the sake of the argument, that the rm continues to be risk neutral but the
CEO becomes risk averse, and we are in Case 2 of the two-type world. Then, the
rst-period maximization problem of the rm is
max
a1;b1;r1
 + (1  2r1) f (r1) 
 
a1 + b1y1
 
; r1

s:t:
E

u
 
a1 + b1y1
 
; r1
  u (IR)
r1 2 argmaxE

u
 
a1 + b1y1
 
; r^1

(IC)
E

u
 
a1 + b1y1
 
; r1
  E u  a1 + b1y1  ; r1  (1  r1)u
2
if r1 6= r1;
(CC)
where the constraints are respectively the individual rationality, incentive compati-
bility, and career concern constraints; u() is a concave utility function; and
E

u
 
a1 + b1y1
 
; r1

=
1  r
2
[u (a1 + b1 (L + f (r1))) + u (a1 + b1 (H + f (r1)))]
+
r
2
[u (a1 + b1 (L   f (r1))) + u (a1 + b1 (H   f (r1)))] : (A-1)
When b1 = 0, then we have E[u(a1+b1y1(; r1))] = u(a1) for all r1 2 [0; 1]. Thus,
(CC) is not satised when b1 = 0. Now, assume that
E[u
 
y
 
; ~r1

]  E[u  y  ; r1] < (1  r1)u
2
; (A-2)
where ~r1 is the probability of failure that maximizes the CEOs rst-period payo¤.
This inequality means that (CC) cannot be satised when a1 = 0 and b1 = 1. Then,
it cannot be satised for all b1 2 [0; 1], either, because E[u(a1 + b1y1(; r1))] is a
continuous function. Thus, the excessively risky project is chosen whenever (A-2) is
satised.
Proof of Lemma 6
Case 1 (H   L  4f(1)): Let us consider each possible r1 2 [0; 1] in turn. If
r1 = 0, then the output will be  + f(0) for certain, in which case the rm infers
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the ability of the CEO from the output. Thus, she is red only when it turns out
that her ability is less than , which implies a probability of being red of 1=2.
Similarly, if r1 = 1, then the output will be   f(1) for certain, and once again the
rm perfectly infers the ability, which implies a probability of being red of 1=2.
If the CEO chooses a project with r1 2 (0; 1), then there must be two (interior)
types 0 and 00 such that the good-state output realization of the 0-type coincides
with the bad-state output realization of the 00-type (i.e., 0 + f(r1) = 00   f(r1)),
and the rms expectation about the CEOs ability after observing this output is 
(i.e., (1  r1) 0 + r100 = ). Then, one can easily nd that 0 =    2r1f(r1) and
00 =  + 2(1  r1)f(r1) for any r1 2 (0; 1).
Figure IV
The partition of CEO types in case 1
Figure IV shows the partition of CEOs on the ability distribution when the
chosen projects probability of failure is r1 2 (0; 1). Because H   L  4f(1), one
can easily show that    2f(r1) > L, which implies that the mass of CEOs in A is
larger than that in C. Thus, there is a subpartition of A = A1 [ A2 such that the
mass in A2 is equal to the mass in C and A1 is the residual partition. Similarly, one
can show that  + 2f(r1) < H for all r1 2 (0; 1) and thus the mass of CEOs in D
is higher than that in B. Hence, there is a subpartition of D = D1 [D2 such that
the mass in D1 is equal to the mass in B and D2 is the residual partition.
Given r1, the good-state output realization of a CEO in A1 coincides with the
bad-state output realization of a below-average CEO, which means that the expec-
tation about her ability is always lower than  regardless of the state. However,
given r1, the bad-state output realization of a CEO in D2 does not coincide with
the good-state output realization of any below-average CEO. Thus, the expectation
about her ability is always higher than  regardless of the state.
We can now derive the probability of being red in each partition. If the CEO is
in A1, then she is red for certain because the rm knows that her ability is below
average for any output realization. On the other hand, if the CEO is in A2, her
good-state output coincides with the bad-state output of a CEO in C. If she is in
the bad state, the rm infers that her ability is less than  and res her. If she is in
the good state, the rm still res her, because the expectation of 0 matching with
00 is  and thus the expectation of any  2 A2 matching with any  2 C must be
lower than .
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If the CEO is in B, her good-state output coincides with the bad-state output of
a CEO in D1 and the expectation about her ability is higher than , which means
that she is not red in case of the good state. However, she is red if she is in
the bad state, as the rm infers that her ability must be less than . Thus, her
probability of being red is r1 if she is in this partition. Next, consider a CEO in
C. Her bad-state output coincides with that of a CEO in A2 and thus her expected
ability is less than , which means that she is red in such a state. Otherwise, she is
in the good state in which case her ability is inferred to be higher than  and thus
the rm keeps her for certain. Thus, the probability of being red in this partition
is also r1.
Now consider a CEO in D1. The bad-state output realization of a CEO in
this partition coincides with the good-state output realization of one in B, and the
expectation about her ability is higher than , which means that she is not red in
such a state. She is not red even when she is in the good state because the rm
infers that her ability is higher than . Thus, a CEO in D1 is rehired for certain.
Finally, a CEO in D2 is also rehired for certain, because, as previously argued, her
ability is perfectly inferred.
Given the above analysis, the overall probability of being red is given by p =
1 Prf 2 Ag+ r1  Prf 2 Bg+ r1  Prf 2 Cg+ 0 Prf 2 Dg, or
p =
   L   2r1f (r1)
H   L + r1
2r1f (r1)
H   L + r1
2 (1  r1) f (r1)
H   L =
1
2
: (A-3)
Because the CEO faces the same probability of being red for any project choice,
she chooses the optimally risky project with r1 as it is the best choice in terms of
her rst-period compensation, as long as she is given some stock ownership. Thus,
she chooses the optimally risky project in equilibrium.
Case 3 (H   L < 2f(1=2)): If H   L  2f(0), outputs do not match in any
case and thus the probability of being red cannot be lower than 1=2. Now, consider
the remaining part of the interval (i.e., 2f(0) < H   L < 2f(1=2)). This time, one
can easily obtain (13) once again by going through exactly the same calculations as
in Case 2. Yet, this time, H   L = 4r1f(r1) < 2f(1=2) which implies r1 < 1=2.
Therefore, we have p = 1=2, which means that the minimum probability of ring
for any project choice is not less than the one with the optimally risky project with
r1. But, then, because r

1 is both the probability of failure level that maximizes
the rst-period compensation and the probability of failure level that minimizes the
probability of being red, the project associated with it is the equilibrium project
choice.
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The Probability of Being Fired with a Continuum of Types
This appendix shows that the guessed project choice with r1 of Case 2 of the
continuum of types is indeed the project choice that minimizes the probability of
being red. We prove this claim in two steps. In the rst step, we show that the
probability of being red is higher for any r1 2 [0; r1) than the one with r1. In the
second step, we prove the same thing for any (r1; 1].
Step 1: Show that p(r1) > p(r1) for all r1 2 [0; r1).
Subcase i: Suppose that the projects probability of failure satises f(r1) =
r1f(r1) < f(r1). Then, there must be a 0-type and a 00-type such that the good-
state output of the 0-type coincides with the bad-state output of the 00-type, and
thus 0 = L + 2(1  r1)f(r1) and 00 = 0 + 2f(r1), and the expectation about them
is (1  r1)0 + r100 = .
Figure V
The partition of CEO types in case 2 (subcase i of step 1)
Figure V portrays the subcase. Note that the mass in A is equal to the mass
in C, and the mass in B is equal to the mass in D. It is easy to see that the
probability of being red is one in A, r1 in B and C, and zero in D. Therefore, the
overall probability of being red is
p (r1) =
2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4f (r1)
+
2r1f (r1)
4f (r1)
=
1
2
; (A-4)
which is obviously higher than p(r1).
Subcase ii: Suppose that the projects probability of failure satises f(r1) <
r1f(r1) < f(r1). Then, there must be a 0-type and a 00-type such that the good-
state output of the 0-type coincides with the bad-state output of the 00-type, and
thus 0 = L + 2r1f(r1)  2r1f(r1) and 00 = 0 + 2f(r1), and the expectation about
them is (1  r1)0 + r100 = .
Figure VI portrays the subcase. Unlike Subcase i, in this subcase, the mass in
A is larger than the mass in C because 2r1f(r1) > 2f(r1) and hence 2r1f(r1)  
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Figure VI
The partition of CEO types in case 2 (subcase ii of step 1)
2r1f(r1) > 2(1 r1)f(r1). For the same reason, 2r1f(r1) 2(1 r1)f(r1) > 2r1f(r1)
and hence the mass in D is larger than the mass in B. It is easy to see that the
probability of being red is one in A, r1 in B and C, and zero in D. Therefore, the
overall probability of being red is
2r1f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
+ r1
2f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
=
1
2
; (A-5)
which is obviously higher than p(r1).
Subcase iii: Suppose that the projects probability of failure satises r1f(r1) <
f(r1) < f(r1). Then, there must be a 0-type, a 00-type, a 000-type, and a 0000-type
such that 0 =    2r1f(r1), 00 = H   2f(r1), 000 = L + 2f(r1), and 0000 =
+2(1  r1)f(r1), as shown in Figure VII. Then, the mass in A is equal to the mass
in E, the mass in C is equal to the mass in D, and the mass in B is equal to the
mass in F . Then, it is easy to see that the probability of being red is one in A and
C, r1 in B and E, and zero in D and F .
Figure VII
The partition of CEO types in case 2 (subcase iii of step 1)
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The probabilities of being red in each partition are given by
Pr f 2 Ag = Pr f 2 Eg = 2r1f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
(A-6)
Pr f 2 Bg = Pr f 2 Fg = 2r1f (r1)  2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
(A-7)
Pr f 2 Cg = Pr f 2 Dg = 2f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
: (A-8)
Therefore, the overall probability of being red is
p (r1) =
2r1f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
+ r1
2r1f (r1)  2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
(A-9)
+
2f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
+ r1
2r1f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
=
4r1r1f (r1)  2 (2r1   1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
:
The CEO follows this strategy if she can decrease her probability of being red to
a level less than 1=2 by doing so:
4r1r1f (r1)  2 (2r1   1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
<
1
2
(A-10)
or 2r1r1f(r1)  (2r1   1)f(r1) < r1f(r1). This is satised when (2r1   1)[r1f(r1) 
f(r1)] < 0, or r1 > 1=2. Now, we need to show that this probability of being red is
higher than p(r1). It is so if
4r1r1f (r1)  2 (2r1   1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
>
2r21   2r1 + 1
2r1
; (A-11)
or (4r1r1   4r21 + 4r1   2)f(r1) > 2(2r1   1)f(r1). Because f(r1) > f(r1), this holds
when 4r1r1   4r21 + 4r1   2 > 2(2r1   1), or (1  r1) (r1   r1) > 0, which is always
satised. Thus, p(r1) > p(r1). This completes the proof of the claim that that
p(r1) > p(r1) for all r1 2 [0; r1).
Step 2: Show that p(r1) > p(r1) for all r1 2 (r1; 1].
Subcase i: Suppose that the projects probability of failure satises f(r1) <
f(r1) = (H   L)=2. Then, the good-state output of the worst type coincides with
the bad-state output of the best type, L + f(r1) = H   f(r1). This means that
 + f(r1) > H   f(r1) for all  2 (L; ). Thus, the rm infers the ability of the
CEO when it observes any output level di¤erent from the overlapped output level,
and thus res the CEO with probability 1=2. If it observes the overlapped output
level, it res the CEO with probability r1=2. Thus, the overall probability of being
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red is approximately 1=2 and denitely higher than p(r1).
Subcase ii: Suppose that the projects probability of failure satises f(r1) <
(H   L)=2 < f(r1). Then, we have + f(r1) > H   f(r1) for all  2 [L; ), which
means that the output realization perfectly signals the ability of a CEO. Thus, the
overall probability of being red is 1=2, which is higher than p(r1).
Subcase iii: Suppose that the projects probability of failure satises f(r1) <
f(r1) < (H   L)=2. Then, there must be a 0-type and a 00-type such that 0 =
H   2f(r1) and 00 = L + 2f(r1), as shown in Figure VIII. The good-state output
of the L-type (0-type) coincides with the bad-state output of the 00-type (H-
type). However, the expectation for both pairs is above . It is easy to see that the
probability of being red is r1 in A, one in B, and zero in C and D.
Figure VIII
The partition of CEO types in case 2 (subcase iii of step 2)
The overall probability of being red is given by
p (r1) = r1
4r1f (r1)  2f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
+
2f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
(A-12)
=
2 (2r1   1) r1f (r1) + 2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
: (A-13)
Remember that
p (r1) =
2 (2r1   1) r1f (r1) + 2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
: (A-14)
Thus, p(r1) > p(r1) if 2(2r1  1)r1f(r1) + 2(1  r1)f(r1) > 2(2r1  1)r1f(r1) + 2(1 
r1)f(r1), which boils down to 4(r1   r1)r1f(r1) + 2(1  r1)f(r1)  2(1  r1)f(r1) >
0. Because f(r1) < f(r1), let f(r1) = f(r1) +  where   0. Then, we have
4(r1   r1)r1f(r1) + 2(1   r1)(f(r1) + )   2(1   r1)f(r1) > 0. This boils down to
2(r1   r1)(2r1   1)f(r1) + 2(1   r1) > 0, which always holds because r1 > 1=2.
Hence, p(r1) > p(r1). This completes the proof of the claim that p(r1) > p(r1) for
all r1 2 (r1; 1].
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Proof of Lemma 8
1. When the rm observes y1, its expectation about the ability of the CEO will
be
E [i j y1] =

1  r1
r1 + 1  r1

L +

r1
r1 + 1  r1

H : (A-15)
This is greater than or equal to  = (1=2)L+(1=2)H i¤ (1 r1)=(r1+1 r1)  1=2,
which holds for all r1 2 [1   r1; 1). Therefore, the rm keeps her in such a state,
which happens with probability 1   r1; otherwise she is red, which happens with
probability r1.
2. When the rm observes y01, its expectation about the ability of the CEO will
be
E [i j y01] =

1  r01
1  r1 + 1  r01

L +

1  r1
1  r1 + 1  r01

H ; (A-16)
This is greater than or equal to  = (1=2)L+(1=2)H if (1 r01)=(1 r1+1 r01)  1=2,
which holds when r01  r1. Note that f(r01)   f(r1) = H   L > 0 in this case.
Hence, f(r01) > f(r

1), which implies that r
0
1 > r

1. Therefore, the rm keeps her in
such a state, which happens with probability 1   r01; otherwise she is red, which
happens with probability r01.
3. When the rm observes y^1, its expectation about the ability of the CEO will
be
E [i j y^1] =

r^1
r1 + r^1

L +

r1
r1 + r^1

H ; (A-17)
This is greater than or equal to  = (1=2)L+(1=2)H if (r^1)=(r1+ r^1)  1=2, which
holds when r^1  r1. Note that f(r1)   f(r^1) = H   L > 0 in this case. Hence,
f(r1) > f(r^1), which implies that r^1 < r

1. Therefore, the rm keeps her in such a
state, which happens with probability r^1; otherwise she is red, which happens with
probability 1  r^1.
Cases under Asymmetric Information
As Lemma 8 suggests, in trying to minimize the probability of being red, the
CEO can choose three possible projects associated with three possible probabilities
of failure: r1, r01, and r^1. The motivation of a low-ability CEO in choosing these
projects is to disguise her type with her project choice. If one of these does not work
or current compensation dominates career concern, the CEO chooses the optimally
risky project with r1. We have already derived the following feasibility conditions in
the text. First, none of the strategies is viable when H   f(r1)  L+ f(1) because
in such a case a low-ability CEO cannot overlap her output with the output of a
high-ability CEO in any state. This forms the lower boundary of Case 1 below.
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Second, as the rst part of Lemma 8 suggests, choosing a project with r1 is not an
e¤ective strategy for a low-ability CEO when r1 2 (0; 1   r1) because it does not
decrease her probability of being red. This forms the lower boundary of Case 2
below.
Third, choosing a project with r01 is a viable strategy only if H+f(r

1) < L+f(1);
otherwise there exists no r01 overlapping the good-state output of a low-ability CEO
with that of a high-ability CEO. This requires H   L 2 (0; f(1)  f(r1)). Fourth,
choosing a project with r^1 is a viable strategy only if L   f(0) > H   f(r1);
otherwise there exists no r^1 overlapping the bad-state output of a low-ability CEO
with that of a high-ability CEO. This requires H   L 2 (0; f(r1)   f(0)). This
condition and the previous one overlap, but both of these conditions are under the
lower boundary of Case 2, f(r1) + f(1   r1).35 Depending on the technology, the
maximum of these two conditions form the lower boundary of Case 3 below and the
minimum of them forms the upper boundary of Case 4. There is also the exceptional
(and measure zero) case in which H   f(r1) = L + f(r1) by chance, which is Case
6. Below, we state all these conditions and analyze them one by one.
Case 1 (H   L 2 [f(r1) + f(1);1)): In this case, H   L is so high that a
low-ability CEO is unable to overlap even her good-state output with the bad-state
output of a high-ability CEO even when she chooses the project which is sure to fail
(i.e., H   f(r1)  L + f(1)). This implies that a high-ability CEOs output when
she chooses the optimally risky project is higher than a low-ability CEOs output for
any project choice. This means that the outputs of di¤erent types cannot overlap,
y1(H ; r

1) > y1(L; r1), for all r1 2 [0; 1] in all states. Thus, if the high-ability CEO
chooses a project with r1, then the rm infers her ability at the end of the period.
As a result, neither a high-ability CEO nor a low-ability one has career concerns,
which means that they choose the optimally risky project with r1 in the rst period
since it maximizes their rst-period compensation. Note that the rm needs to pay
some positive amount of stock ownership to guarantee this.
Lemma 10 (Case 1) If H   L 2 [f(r1) + f(1);1), then both types choose the
optimally risky project with r1 in equilibrium. Outputs do not overlap in any state
combination and thus the rm infers the type of the CEO at the end of the rst
period. It res the low-ability CEOs and rehires the high-ability ones.
Case 2 (H   L 2 [f(r1) + f(1   r1); f(r1) + f(1))): We analyze this case in
the text.
35. f(r1)+f(1 r1) is trivially higher than f(r1) f(0). The concavity of the risk-
return function implies that f(r1)+ f(1  r1) > f(1), and hence f(r1)+ f(1  r1) >
f(1)  f(r1) must hold as well.
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Case 3 (H   L 2 [maxff(1)   f(r1); f(r1)   f(0)g; f(r1) + f(1   r1))): The
analysis of this case is trivial because none of the projects with r1, r01, or r^1 is viable
in this case. Hence, the type of a CEO will be inferred anyway and her probability of
being red will be independent of her project choice. Consequently, she chooses the
optimally risky project in order to maximize her rst-period compensation. Note
that the rm needs to pay some positive amount of stock ownership to guarantee
this.
Lemma 11 (Case 3) If H   L 2 [maxff(1)  f(r1); f(r1)  f(0)g; f(r1) + f(1 
r1)), then both types of CEOs choose the optimally risky project with r

1 in equilib-
rium. Outputs do not overlap in any state combination and thus the rm infers the
type of the CEO at the end of the rst period. It res the low-ability CEOs and
rehires the high-ability ones.
Case 4 (H   L 2 [minff(1)  f(r1); f(r1)  f(0)g;maxff(1)  f(r1); f(r1) 
f(0)g)): The analysis of this case is also trivial. If f(1) + f(0) > 2f(r1), then
overlapping her good-state output with that of a high-ability CEO is optimal for a
low-ability CEO and thus she chooses a project with r01. If, however, f(1) + f(0) <
2f(r1), then overlapping her bad-state output with that of a high-ability CEO is
optimal for a low-ability CEO, and thus she chooses a project with r^1. Because a
high-ability CEO is always rehired, she does not have career concerns and chooses
the optimally risky project to maximize her rst-period compensation. These are the
projects that minimize the probability of being red, not necessarily the equilibrium
choices. If minimizing the probability of being red is not optimal, a low-ability CEO
chooses the optimally risky project with r1. The probability of failure r
0
1 is higher
than the probability of failure r1 of the optimally risky project but the managerial
action-return function may have positive or negative NPV depending on whether
the probability of failure is above or below 1=2.
Lemma 12 (Case 4) If H   L 2 [minff(1)   f(r1); f(r1)   f(0)g;maxff(1)  
f(r1); f(r

1)   f(0)g), then a high-ability CEO chooses the optimally risky project
with r1 in equilibrium and rehired for certain in the second period. A low-ability
CEO minimizes her probability of being red by choosing the excessively risky project
with r01 if f(1) + f(0) > 2f(r

1) and overlap her good-state output realization with
the good-state output realization of a high-ability CEO. In this case, she is red with
probability r01. She minimizes her probability of being red by choosing the project
with r^1 if f(1) + f(0) < 2f(r1) and overlaps her bad-state output realization with
the bad-state output realization of a high-ability CEO. In this case, the rm rehires
the high-ability CEO while it res the low-ability CEO with probability 1  r^1.
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Case 5 (H   L 2 (0;minff(1)  f(r1); f(r1)  f(0)g)): If a low-ability CEO
chooses a project with r01, her probability of being red is r
0
1; if she chooses a project
with r^1, her probability of being red is 1   r^1. Hence, the CEO chooses a project
with r01 or r^1 in order to minimize her probability of being red. We know that
L + f(r
0
1) = H + f(r

1) and L   f(r^1) = H   f(r1). Thus, r01  1  r^1 if and only
if
f 1 (H   L + f (r1)) + f 1 (L   H + f (r1))  1: (A-18)
However, it might be the case that the CEO still chooses the project with r01 if her
compensation benet in the rst period overweighs her career benet in expected
payo¤. However, it turns out that this is not the case. The compensation of a low-
ability CEO is weakly higher with r^1 than with r01. If the rm o¤ers a xed wage, then
evidently her compensations under both project choices are equal. Suppose that the
rm o¤ers a positive amount of stock ownership. Combining L+f(r01) = H+f(r

1)
and L   f(r^1) = H   f(r1) gives jf (r^1)  f (r1)j = jf (r01)  f (r1)j, and because
the risk-return function is concave, this implies jr^1   r1j < jr01   r1j. We know
that the expected return is a continuous and concave function in its positive range
and that it is maximized at r1. Thus, expected return decreases as we move away
from the r1. As a result, the expected return is always higher under r^1 than it is
under r01. Hence, if a positive amount of stock ownership is o¤ered, then the current
compensation is higher under r^1 than it is under r01. This means that we get a project
whose probability of failure is less than that of the optimally risky one undertaken
in equilibrium.
Lemma 13 (Case 5) If H L 2 (0;minff(1) f(r1); f(r1) f(0)g), then a high-
ability CEO chooses the optimally risky project with r1 whereas a low-ability CEO
chooses the project with r^1 as long as (A-18) is satised. In this case, the low-ability
CEO overlaps her bad-state output with the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO,
and the rm rehires the high-ability CEO while it res the low-ability CEO with
probability 1  r^1.
This lemma is a su¢ ciency condition for choosing the project with r^1. If (A-18)
is not satised, whether the CEO chooses a project with r^1 or r01 depends on the
exact trade-o¤ between layo¤ risk and current compensation. As a matter of fact,
the choice between a project with r^1 and a project with r01 is very sensitive to the
technology. For example, if the managerial action-return function is linear, then
probability of being red with r01 is lower than that with r^1 and the rst-period
compensation is same for both project choices. Hence, a project with r01 would
certainly dominate a project with r^1.
Case 6 (H   L = 2f(r1)): This is a knife-edge case in which L + f(r1) =
64
y1 = H   f(r1). When the rm observes y1, its expectation about the type of the
CEO will be E[i j y1] = r1H + (1   r1)L, which is less than  because r1 < 1=2.
Therefore, the rm res the CEO after such an observation. It res the CEO even
when it observes y(L; r1) 6= y1 in which case her ability is inferred. Thus, she has
no career incentive, which means that she chooses a project with r1 in the rst
period as it maximizes her rst-period compensation. However, by di¤erentiating
her output from the output of a low-ability CEO, a high-ability CEO can decrease
her probability of being red from r1 to zero. As a result, the high-ability CEO will
choose a project whose probability of failure is arbitrarily close (but not equal to) r1.
These are the projects that minimize the probability of being red, not necessarily
the equilibrium project choices. If minimizing the probability of being red is not
optimal, she chooses the optimally risky project with r1.
Lemma 14 (Case 6) If H f(r1) = L+f(r1), low-ability CEOs take the optimally
risky project with r1 whereas high-ability CEOs choose a project whose probability
of failure is arbitrarily close (but not equal to) r1. Outputs do not overlap in any
state combination and thus the rm infers the type of the CEO at the end of the rst
period. It res the low-ability CEOs and rehires the high-ability ones.
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